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Title: A Precarious Home: Japanese American Incarceration, Citizenship, and Strategies 
for Belonging, 1940s-1960s 
 
Japanese Americans on the West Coast experienced multiple losses of home 
before, during, and after their incarceration during World War II. Repeated and coerced 
migration and exclusion uprooted Japanese Americans from physical and imagined 
homes, characterizing their experience of belonging in the United States. Their 
continuing struggle to regain “home” is apparent in the continuing geographic, social, and 
legal displacement that many Japanese Americans experienced during the postwar period. 
This thesis explores the relationship between home and Japanese American identity—
how identity influenced the “home” and the strategies that they pursued, and how the 
stakes and longevity of incarceration clarified the boundaries of citizenship and 
belonging for them. Looking at incarceration as part of a long pattern of uprootedness 
allows insight to the way that repeated denial of Japanese American access to home and 
belonging was part of the experience of—and barriers to—conditional inclusion in the 
United States. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Early in November 1958, Toshiko Chuman opened her mail to a crucial verdict. 
She was, once again, a citizen of the United States.1 She had been anticipating the letter 
for quite some time—ever since she submitted her revised legal forms for her ongoing 
court case in March of the same year.2 Her request for citizenship had been denied 
multiple times before. The most recent denial had also arrived in a letter, and she may 
have wondered as she opened this envelope if she would find another identical notice. 
Instead, she found a letter from her lawyer, Wayne Collins. He told her that it would take 
a month or so before she could “attempt to exercise any of the rights that are peculiar and 
exclusive to citizens,” but that her twelve year quest for restored citizenship was, for all 
intents and purposes, over.3 Her path to citizenship was no ordinary one. Toshiko 
Chuman was born a citizen of the United States in Los Angeles in the year 1918. At the 
age of twenty-six, she elected to renounce her birthright citizenship. This decision 
determined the difficulty she would experience in regaining her United States citizenship. 
The multiple denials she received reflected the Department of Justice’s reluctance to 
reverse her original decision, likely making this letter all the more surprising. Perhaps she 
leaned back in her chair and gave a sigh of relief, or maybe she nodded knowingly and 
put the letter away. Either way, she likely imparted the news to her husband later that 
day.  
                                               
1 Wayne Collins to Toshiko Chuman, 29 October 1958, folder 12, box 7, Wayne M. Collins Papers 1918-
1974 (hereafter Collins Papers), Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, CA (hereafter 
BANC). 
2 Affidavit of Toshiko Chuman, 8 February 1958, folder 12, box 7, Collins Papers, BANC. 
3 Affidavit of Toshiko Chuman, 8 February 1958, folder 12, box 7, Collins Papers, BANC. 
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 Her husband, Hayao Chuman, was all too familiar with her ongoing pursuit of 
restored citizenship. He, too, had renounced his United States citizenship while 
incarcerated with over one hundred and ten thousand other Japanese Americans during 
World War II.4 The categorical dislocation and incarceration of all Japanese Americans 
on the West Coast was framed as a strategic response to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in 
December 1941.5 Amidst fears of sabotage and espionage from Japanese immigrant 
communities, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 two 
months later, authorizing their mass removal from the West Coast. Following the Civilian 
Exclusion Order issued by the military for their respective neighborhoods, the Chumans 
were given one week to make arrangements for Hayao’s horticultural nursery and for the 
restaurant Toshiko’s parents owned, as well as their homes, belongings, and other 
                                               
4 There are conflicting reports in secondary literature of the total number of people removed and 
incarcerated, ranging from 110,000 to 120,000. I use 110,000 here as a conservative estimate.  
5 After some debate, the most common, agreed upon term to describe Japanese American removal from the 
West Coast and the lack of freedom during the war is “incarceration.” This is the primary term that I utilize 
in this project. Correspondingly, I use “incarcerees” to describe Japanese Americans in confinement and 
“incarceration camp” or “camp” to refer to the facilities used to detain them. The unique nature of the 
facilities used to incarcerate Japanese Americans and the circumstances surrounding their removal to, and 
exit from, these facilities makes most terminology—including “incarceration”—problematic in some way. 
“Incarceration” is linked to an expanding field of scholarship on the carceral system and state tools of 
control. Some scholars critique the use of this term because it implies punishment for a crime, but I think it 
aptly captures the way that identity in the United States is often criminalized. It replaces previously popular 
terms—“internment,” “concentration camp,” and “relocation center”—that mischaracterize incarceration. I 
also use “forced removal,” “mass removal,” and “displacement” based on the context of my analysis, 
although these terms are never meant to minimize the coerced nature of incarceration. On this terminology, 
see Connie Chiang, Nature Behind Barbed Wire: An Environmental History of the Japanese American 
Incarceration (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), xiii-xv; Roger Daniels, “Words Do Matter: A 
Note on Inappropriate Terminology and the Incarceration of Japanese Americans,” in Nikkei in the Pacific 
Northwest: Japanese Americans and Japanese Canadians in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2005). On race and the carceral system, see Kelly Lytle Hernandez, City of Inmates: 
Conquest, Rebellion, and the Rise of Human Caging in Los Angeles (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 2017); Kelly Lytle Hernandez, Migra!: A History of the U.S. Border Control 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010); Erika Lee, At America’s Gates: Chinese Immigration 
during the Exclusion Era, 1882-1943 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Torrie 
Hester, Deportation: Origins of U.S. Policy (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017). 
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affairs.6 They moved first to the Santa Anita Assembly Center, then to incarceration 
camps in Jerome and then Rohwer, Arkansas in the span of a few months.7 Frequent 
migration became a consistent theme in their lives. They uprooted themselves from the 
spaces they came to call home, as well as the communities that also inhabited these 
places. The War Relocation Authority (WRA), the federal agency created to facilitate 
mass removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans during the war, distributed a 
polarizing questionnaire in 1943 to determine the loyalty of the incarcerated population. 
The Chumans’ decision to withhold pledges of allegiance and military service on this 
infamous questionnaire flagged them as particularly suspect in the eyes of the U.S. 
government. They were moved, along with others who answered the questionnaire 
similarly, to a newly founded “segregation center” at Tule Lake.  
This flat, barren landscape on the border of eastern Oregon and California is 
where many stories of migration and “disloyalty” converge. Today, this former lake bed 
consists mainly of farmland. Brown, arid land stretches out to a distant horizon line, 
broken up by the shocking green of irrigated fields. The only structure left standing from 
the rows and rows of uniform barracks that once made up the segregation camp of Tule 
Lake is the jail. The Chumans never spent any time in what was more commonly known 
as the “stockade,” but the structure was well used during their time at Tule Lake. This 
one remaining structure symbolizes the atmosphere of unrest within the camp and the 
                                               
6 The military command responsible for defense of the West Coast, the Western Defense Command (WDC) 
posted Civilian Exclusion Orders in different military zones to notify Japanese American inhabitants of the 
date and conditions of their impending expulsion. Affidavit of Toshiko Chuman, 8 February 1958, folder 
12, box 7, Collings Papers, BANC; Hayao Chuman and Toshiko Chuman to Thomas M. Cooley II Jr., 26 
September 1946, folder 10, box 7, Collins Papers, BANC.  
7 Toshiko Chuman to Wayne M. Collins, 1944-1969 Renunciants, folder 12, box 7, Collins Papers, BANC.  
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stigma of disloyalty that incarcerees of Tule Lake carried. In the time the Chumans spent 
at Tule Lake, they crossed paths with many others similarly uprooted and maligned. 
Perceptions of disloyalty continued to exacerbate the limitations of their access to 
stability and community. They even found themselves separated from each other for over 
a year when Hayao was sent to a detention center in Texas for his participation in the 
Hokoku Seinen Dan, a Japanese nationalist organization. Toshiko joined him in the Santa 
Fe, Texas, detention center in April 1946.8 All in all, both were incarcerated in a total of 
five different incarceration and detention camps during the war. Political displacement 
paralleled geographic dislocation; the Chumans were two of the five thousand and five 
hundred people to renounce United States citizenship in response to their incarceration 
during the war.9  
 They spent the years after the war trying to rebuild their lives, but the state of 
uprootedness that plagued them during the war followed them for long afterward. Having 
lost both their homes and their jobs in Los Angeles when they were forcibly removed to 
the camps, they found themselves with nowhere to go after they were released from the 
detention center in Santa Fe. They moved their growing family from Texas to 
Massachusetts to Illinois, and—finally—back to Los Angeles, California. Together, they 
engaged in a legal dispute with the Department of Justice as they tried to prove that they 
deserved—and wanted—the return of their birthright citizenship. Hayao Chuman also 
received a letter from Collins in 1958. His letter, though, contained news of the second of 
                                               
8 Hayao Chuman and Toshiko Chuman to Thomas M. Cooley II Jr, September 26, 1946, 1944-1969 
Renunciants, folder 10, box 7, Collins Papers, BANC.  
9 Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), 189.  
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many rejections he would receive from the Department of Justice.10 Ultimately, the 
government decided there was not enough evidence to prove that his decision to renounce 
citizenship was made under circumstances of “fear, coercion, or duress.”11 In his case, the 
Attorney General’s office maintained the validity of wartime incarceration, as well as 
disregard for those who rebelled against it; someone who “freely” decided to give up U.S. 
citizenship did not deserve it back. With both these letters in hand, Hayao and Toshiko 
Chuman’s lives continued on in the Los Angeles suburbs. After more than a decade of 
statelessness and migration, one of them could claim the rights and obligations of 
citizenship, but the other could not.12  
 The contours of their stories indicate the complexity and longevity of Japanese 
American dislocation during the war. Their stories also provide insight into the ways that 
dual nationalism and transcultural identities complicated commitment to continuing life 
in the United States, as well as perceptions of their viability for conditional inclusion.13 
Japanese Americans were suspected of disloyalty. This perception did not ultimately 
result in deportation or criminal sentencing, but it was enough to uproot them from the 
                                               
10 Hayao Chuman received rejection letters from the Department of Justice on April 11, 1955, December 
26, 1957 (though he was not informed of this rejection until March 20, 1958), March 21, 1960, and 
February 26, 1964. Warren E. Burger to Lloyd H. Burke, 11 April 1955, folder 10, box 7, Collins Papers, 
BANC; George Cochran Doub to Lloyd H. Burke, 26 December 1957, folder 10, box 7, Collins Papers, 
BANC; Wayne M. Collins to Hayao Chuman, 20 March 1958, folder 10, box 7, Collins Papers, BANC; 
George Cochran Doub to Lynn J. Gillard, 21 March 1960, folder 10, box 7, Collins Papers, BANC; John 
W. Douglas to Cecil F. Poole, 26 February 1964, folder 10, box 7, Collins Papers, BANC.   
11 Precedent established in Acheson v. Murakami. 
12 The framing of citizenship as a combination of both rights and obligations comes from Linda Kerber, No 
Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1998). 
13 For further reading on the concept of “conditional inclusion,” see Madeline Y. Hsu and Ellen D. Wu, 
““Smoke and Mirrors”: Conditional Inclusion, Model Minorities, and the Pre-1965 Dismantling of Asian 
Exclusion,” Journal of American Ethnic History, 34 (Summer 2015). For further reading on dual 
nationalism and transcultural identities, see Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 200.   
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nation and their sense of belonging for a prolonged period of time. For some, however, 
complex national and cultural identities that reflected significant ties to both America and 
Japan exacerbated the severity and longevity of this uprooting. The Chumans do not 
represent all Japanese American incarcerees, nor all of those who passed through Tule 
Lake’s gates. They are, however, representative of this correlation. They were both Kibei; 
they had familial and cultural ties to Japan that made a future there more viable to them.14 
They made choices for their future, in part, based on circumstances and backgrounds not 
shared by all Japanese Americans. Beyond that, their story is an example of the range of 
personal and emotional choices made amidst oppressive circumstances. In other words, 
Japanese American agency during incarceration can not be summed up by any simple 
narrative.  
The ways in which Japanese Americans navigated the choices imposed by 
“circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted” from their own past and 
from incarceration varied widely.15 They were not a monolithic group, though they were 
consistently portrayed as such by Americans who attributed aberrant qualities to them in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—as well as seemingly “positive” traits in 
                                               
14 This project utilizes the terms “Issei,” (first generation), “Nisei” (second generation), and “Kibei” (those 
of the second generation Japanese Americans who received an education in Japan and returned to the 
United States) to describe individuals’ identities. These terms are useful in understanding the general 
differences that distinguished immigrant generational identity, but only to an extent. The terms ultimately 
represent groups with a wide range of ages, experiences, beliefs, and identities that cannot be fully 
encapsulated by a generational descriptor. Furthermore, I refer to both Issei and Nisei as “Japanese 
Americans”—a designation previously reserved for Nisei who held birthright citizenship in the United 
States. Issei were legally barred from citizenship in the United States, but most had lived in the United 
States for several decades by the 1940s and planned to stay.14 “Japanese American,” therefore, includes all 
generations within this immigrant-ethnic community, regardless of citizenship status. On the importance of 
legal barriers to citizenship and Issei conceptions of belonging, see Connie Chiang’s “Note on 
Terminology” in Nature Behind Barbed Wire. 
15 Walter Johnson, “On Agency,” Journal of Social History, 37 (Autumn, 2003): 113-124.  
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the latter part of the twentieth century.16 Furthermore, the emphasis on loyalty during the 
war rewarded self-representations of Japanese American identity as patriotic, upstanding 
members of their community committed to the task of assimilation into mainstream, 
heteronormative American society.17 These self-representations were strategic in many 
ways, opening up employment and resettlement opportunities and inviting praise. Indeed, 
the Nisei Japanese American soldier emerged as an iconic figure and symbol of all 
Japanese Americans’ noble sacrifice in the years after the war.18 These narratives, though 
instrumental in facilitating avenues to opportunity, obscured the story of people like the 
Chumans and patterns of loss woven throughout incarceration. The Chumans’ story, as 
well as the stories of others that experienced a similar loss of home, demonstrates the 
intricate ways in which conditions such as loyalty were constructed and became bound to 
citizenship, as well as the experience of uprootedness shared by all incarcerees. While 
perceived disloyalty sometimes exacerbated the frequency and extent of displacement, 
these patterns extended to all Japanese Americans on the West Coast. 
Ultimately, this project asks the following questions: How did incarceration 
redefine the conditions for Japanese American belonging in the United States? How did 
incarceration redraw lines of solidarity and dissent within this immigrant-ethnic 
community? And how can the experiences of those who offered competing narratives to 
the moderate, patriotic Japanese American identity that emerged in postwar America 
                                               
16 For further reading on the “model minority” trope, see Ellen Wu, The Color of Success: Asian Americans 
and the Origins of the Model Minority (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), Madeline Hsu, The 
Good Immigrants: How the Yellow Peril Became the Model Minority (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2015), and Erika Lee, The Making of Asian America: A History (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2015).  
17 Hsu and Wu, “Smoke and Mirrors,” 54-60. 
18 Ibid, 57.  
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inform our understanding of the lengths to which people went to gain conditional 
inclusion? The answers to these questions lie in the notion of home—meaning the space, 
community, or common identity that fosters a sense of belonging and stability—as both a 
physical and an imagined concept. This story is not just about incarceration or ethnicity 
or citizenship; it is about how the intersection of these concepts can help us understand 
the multiple meanings of “home,” as well as the power of limiting access to it. The term 
“home” is applied broadly here in order to avoid normative applications of the term and 
account for the multiple ways in which individuals may define home: by people, place, 
identity, access to rights and status, and so forth. The term uprootedness, then, describes 
the separation from “home” in all its various meanings. It encompasses the experience of 
coerced changes in relationships to place and community, and to the rights and 
obligations of citizenship.19 Incarceration was not a static or isolated condition; it was 
part of a larger series of compelled migrations, dispossessions, and exclusions. Repeated 
migration and the looming threat of legal and physical removal from the state upended 
Japanese Americans’ sense of home and stability. This unstable experience of home 
provides a lens through which to view the dimensions of the loss that this community 
sustained and the methods for remediating that loss, as well as the impact of these 
processes on perceived and lived identities as Japanese Americans.  
The scholarship on Japanese American incarceration is vast. Early scholarship 
focused on the harsh conditions of the camps, fervently dispelling myths of incarceration 
as “evacuation.”20 The movement for redress in the Japanese American community 
                                               
19 Kerber, No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies.  
20 Roger Daniels, Concentration Camps USA: Japanese Americans and World War II (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1971). 
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during the 1970s and 1980s likely shaped the creation of much of this scholarship. 
Historians emphasized Japanese American loyalty and Americanism, reading these 
concepts backwards upon people and obscuring individual agency. Indeed, not all 
Japanese Americans would not have identified as loyal Americans—not that this made 
their decisions any less rational or their incarceration any less unjust. Scholars have 
clarified the injustice of wartime incarceration by exploring the legal and political 
motivations for the camps, focusing on specific government figures or the handling of 
court cases. These narratives often center military or government figures, such as General 
John DeWitt of the Western Defense Command and President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, to explore political incentives, racially motivated fears, and the impact that 
bureaucrat’s personal viewpoints had on incarceration.21 Incarceration stood on shaky 
constitutional ground to begin with and had little precedent to stand on. New bureaucratic 
entities had to be created, and those entities developed new, often contentious, 
relationships with other agencies. The most notable agency created during this period was 
the War Relocation Authority (WRA), which became part of the Department of the 
Interior. Personal decisions of mid-level bureaucrats and the goals of respective 
departments shaped the mechanisms and design of incarceration as a system. These 
decisions determined stipulations for release, infrastructure and employment in the 
camps, and design of the loyalty questionnaire. Many scholars have investigated the 
                                               
21 Greg Robinson, By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2001); Richard Drinnon, Keeper of Concentration Camps: Dillon S. Myer and 
American Racism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Brian Masaru Hayashi, Democratizing 
the Enemy: The Japanese American Internment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Eric L. 
Muller, American Inquisition: The Hunt for Japanese American Disloyalty in World War II (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 2007).  
  19 
incarceration system as a top-down institution, foregrounding bureaucratic agencies or 
figures, though increasingly some scholars have focused on overt forms of resistance.22  
Although the topics of incarceration’s legality, the personal culpability of 
government bureaucrats, and the harsh conditions of the camps have continued to feature 
in recent scholarship, the past twenty years have seen an increase in works that frame 
Japanese American incarceration as a continuation of larger patterns and investigate 
Japanese American experiences with a keen eye toward agency. Scholars have shifted 
their attention to incorporate histories of immigration restriction and legal barriers 
leading up to incarceration in an effort to demonstrate that Asian American history has 
much to offer the study of race and immigration in the United States. Other scholars have 
taken a comparative approach, often through legal or political lenses. Mae Ngai, for 
example, has examined restrictive immigration restriction as a tool the U.S. government 
wielded against groups in times deemed most politically, economically, and socially 
beneficial. Her work deconstructs the value of legal status as a category specifically 
created in order to facilitate the exclusion of others from that exact category.23 Ngai’s 
work is part of a growing collection of works that analyze the experiences of different 
racial or ethnic minority groups to interrogate the ways in which the state has created 
institutions, such as deportation and incarceration, for social control and the reification of 
                                               
22 Eric L. Muller, Free to Die for their Country: The Story of the Japanese American Draft Resisters in 
World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), Tetsuden Kashima, Judgment Without Trial: 
Japanese American Imprisonment During World War II (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003); 
Jason Scott Smith, “New Deal Public Works at War: The WPA and Japanese American Internment” 
Pacific Historical Review 72 (Feb, 2003): 63-92.  
23 Ngai, Impossible Subjects. 
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difference within the United States.24 Kelly Lytle Hernandez, in particular, links the 
carceral state to the settler colonial project. Her work bridges histories of immigration, 
settler colonialism, labor, race, and gender to interrogate the use of incarceration as a 
means of “elimination.” Though her project does not address Japanese American 
incarceration specifically, her analysis of incarceration as a means to revoke and control 
the rights and movement of racialized outsiders within a specific territory creates a useful 
framework for understanding Japanese American incarceration as part of the history of a 
carceral state. Scholarship has also shifted its lens toward transnational or global 
perspectives that follow migrant communities and recognize the limitations of the nation 
as a framework for understanding immigrant identities and movements.25  
The use of social and cultural lenses facilitated some of this analysis as early as 
the 1990s. Most prominently, historian Valerie Matsumoto approached the story of 
several small farming communities before and after the war, using the changing social 
and cultural landscapes of these communities to demonstrate the role of incarceration in 
shifting community needs and identity.26 Her decision to extend her analysis to the years 
prior to and after the end of the war in Farming the Home Place (1993) has been echoed 
by more recent works. Extending the typical timeline of incarceration beyond the end of 
the war has facilitated the exploration of a growing breadth of topics and analytical 
                                               
24 Ngai, Impossible Subjects; Dan Kanstroom, Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American History 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), Hernandez, City of Inmates.  
25 Madeline Y. Hsu, Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home: Transnationalism and Migration between the 
United States and South China, 1882-1943 (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000); Eiichiro 
Azuma, Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japanese America (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005).  
26 Valerie Matsumoto, Farming the Home Place: A Japanese American Community in California, 1919-
1982 (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993).  
  21 
lenses. For example, a growing body of works evaluate changing family dynamics, Nisei 
women’s role in bridging cultural divides, and the subversion of heteronormative 
expectations through a gendered lens.27 Farming the Home Place (1993) also provides 
insight to instances in which entire communities were able to return to their homes, but 
these instances were rare. Most Japanese Americans struggled to return to their original 
homes, only to find them occupied and others simply chose to resettle elsewhere. The 
disparate nature of sources that provide insight to Japanese American lives post-war is 
evident in works like Greg Robinson’s After Camp, in which he provides “portraits” of 
Japanese American lives in postwar America.28 Although his analysis ultimately 
concludes that resettlement followed no distinguishing regional patterns besides the 
particular characteristics of local communities and Japanese Americans, Connie Chiang’s 
application of an environmental lens suggests the answer to incarceration and 
resettlement patterns lies in the familiarity of the environment and the labor it requires.29 
Her work applies the lens of environmental history to incarceration more broadly, 
interrogating the values imbued in the landscape and the way that Japanese American 
relationships to the environment of the camps through labor, leisure, and ideology 
facilitated key moments of resistance and agency. Valerie Matsumoto’s work in City 
Girls suggests that resettlement in Los Angeles was facilitated, at least in part, by Nisei 
                                               
27 Valerie Matsumoto, City Girls: The Nisei Social World in Los Angeles, 1920-1950 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014); John Howard, Concentration Camps on the Home Front: Japanese Americans in 
the House of Jim Crow (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008).  
28 Greg Robinson, After Camp: Portraits in Midcentury Japanese American Life and Politics (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2012).  
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women’s ethnocultural networks that provided support in facing social and economic 
barriers.30 These works have paid increasing attention to the period of resettlement 
directly following the war as a crucial period in understanding changes in family and 
community dynamics, as well as continuing patterns of hardship.  
In more recent years, scholarship has delved into the creation of the model 
minority trope.31 The framework of conditional inclusion—the idea that access to 
political participation and socioeconomic mobility for certain groups is contingent upon 
those individuals bearing (or choosing to portray the appearance of) select traits—has 
guided scholarship in bridging the period of anti-Asian sentiment and the creation of this 
trope.32 Madeline Hsu discusses the creation of the model minority—and of the “right” 
kind of Asian—as an alternative method of creating difference and implementing 
immigration control. Although the model minority trope did not fully appear until 1960s, 
the conditions of inclusion in the context of wartime America required Japanese 
Americans to “perform” citizenship in order to access freedom, employment, community, 
and stability during the period of incarceration.33  
Although implicitly and often explicitly linked to displacement and loss, the focal 
points of incarceration and resettlement in these works point toward another pattern: the 
link between home and identity. The use of “home” as a lens allows us to consider the 
impact of repeated migration and prolonged displacement on identity before, during, and 
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after incarceration. It complicates the link between the state’s use of legal and social 
methods of control and the formation of ethnic identity formation. It builds upon recent 
scholarship’s exploration of citizenship as an unstable and precarious category. 
Citizenship, while commonly understood through the rights and obligations attached to it, 
is also constructed in the words and actions of those who conduct themselves like 
citizens.34 The ways that both citizens and noncitizens alike chose to access belonging 
destabilizes citizenship as a dividing line between inclusion and exclusion. An 
examination of the patterns of uprooting allows an examination of the range of ways that 
Japanese Americans identified home and found their way back to it—sometimes crossing 
the boundaries of nation or “acceptable” self-representations of ethnic identity to do it.  
The first step in understanding the pattern of uprooting is to investigate divisions 
between “loyal” and “disloyal” Japanese Americans. This project’s first chapter will look 
at the ways that many incarcerees employed the language of loyalty to indicate 
belonging. Loyalty was often linked to—and used to bolster—Japanese American claims 
to citizenship, creating an inferior version of citizenship that required performative 
loyalty in order to leave incarceration and regain access to home. Their forced removal 
from home made the stakes of belonging very clear. Using loyalty to reclaim belonging 
was strategic, but restrictive. It opened up conditional avenues to finding “home” again 
that many were willing to follow. Those who were not willing to or could not pursue 
these strategies, then, symbolized “disloyalty”—a designation that often exacerbated the 
degree to which Japanese Americans were uprooted.  
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The topics of chapters two and three examine the patterns of uprooting from 
physical places, communities, imagined homes, and citizenship. Chapter two follows 
Japanese Americans throughout the period of incarceration and afterward to draw out the 
frequency of their movement. All incarcerees experienced frequent migration as a 
consequence of their identity as Japanese Americans and, as a result, experienced 
multiple losses of home. This instability and the loss of both physical and imagined 
homes, then, comprises an important experience shared by all West Coast Japanese 
Americans. It also clarified the stakes of meeting the conditions of Japanese American 
belonging in the United States. However, “home” is particular to the individual. Not 
everyone reacted to the loss of “home” or strategized how to get it back in the same way. 
Those who chose to renounce their United States citizenship or expatriate to Japan are the 
subject of this project’s third chapter. The strategies that this group employed help to 
identify the range of ways that Japanese Americans envisioned “home” and belonging in 
their future. Appeals for the return of their citizenship status reveal the ways that stateless 
individuals in the United States and in Japan experienced legal uprootedness as a result of 
their unwillingness or inability to meet the conditions for Japanese American inclusion.  
I ultimately argue that we must look to the concept of “home” in order to 
understand the legacies of incarceration. Japanese Americans experienced repeated 
separation from physical and imagined homes during incarceration—but this pattern 
existed before and continued after incarceration, as well. Forced uprooting from familiar 
places, communities, and legal and social status exacerbated the trauma of an already 
precarious relationship to home and highlighted the boundaries of citizenship for them. 
Japanese Americans were expected to demonstrate that they deserved to regain access to 
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belonging. Access to home and citizenship for Japanese Americans, then, was earned—
not given or inherent.  Japanese Americans made choices for their future that reflected 
their adaptation to these oppressive circumstances and conditions for belonging. In other 
words, the ideal vision of “home” and belonging that they pursued while incarcerated 
changed based on the strategic choices they saw available to them. Japanese Americans 
experience of repeated and prolonged displacement, therefore, defined the ways they 
experienced and pursued conditional inclusion in the United States.
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CHAPTER II 
“GOOD AMERICANS”: THE CONSTRUCTION OF JAPANESE AMERICAN 
“DISLOYALTY” AT TULE LAKE 
“O, what is loyalty 
If it be something  
That can bend 
With every wind? 
 
Steadfast I stand,  
Staunchly I plant 
The Stars and Stripes 
Before my barracks door,  
Crying defiance 
To all wavering hearts. 
 
I am a citizen— 
I can take  
The bad with good.”1 
—Sada Murayama, incarcerated at Tule Lake, CA   
 
 On May 27, 1943 the Tulean Dispatch, a newspaper run by Japanese American 
Nisei incarcerated in the Tule Lake camp, published this poem as part of their special 
anniversary edition marking one year since the camp opened. Sada Murayama’s poem, 
printed next to a sketch of one of the camp’s many guard towers, posited loyalty both as a 
marker of personal strength in the face of adversity and as a characteristic of citizenship. 
And yet the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution defines citizens as “all 
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.”2 
Citizenship consists of a series of rights and obligations to the state. These rights and 
obligations, though, are not clearly defined and have been applied unevenly; their 
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application has divided along lines of race, ethnicity, class, and gender.3 Two-thirds of 
the Japanese American population incarcerated during the war were United States 
citizens. Incarceration revealed the particular limitations placed upon Japanese American 
citizen rights, as well as the particular obligations the government asked them to fulfil. 
Incarcerated without due process and robbed of material possessions, the U.S. 
government asked Japanese Americans to prove their loyalty to the state. As reflected in 
Murayama’s poem, loyalty to one’s country meant nothing if it could not withstand tests 
of its limits. Strong loyalty was part and parcel of citizenship and belonging in the United 
States for Japanese Americans; “[taking] the bad” that came with it—in this case, 
incarceration on the basis of national origin—was simply part of being “American.” 
During World War II, unconditional exclusion from the West Coast revealed just how 
willing the United States was to differentiate the requirements and stakes of Japanese 
American citizenship and loyalty from those of the rest of the country’s citizens. 
Incarceration also robbed noncitizens of “equal protections” guaranteed to “all persons.”4 
Citizens or not, though, incarceration represented a violation of constitutional law. 
Categorical incarceration and simultaneous demands for allegiance demonstrated that 
Japanese American citizenship—and presence—came with stricter guidelines and fewer 
benefits. These benefits were tenuous and often fell subject to removal.    
 The issue of Tulean Dispatch containing Murayama’s poem opened with a 
dedication that further contextualizes the poem’s discussion of Japanese American 
citizenship. The dedication identified the gratitude of the Tulean Dispatch staff and the 
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many other “loyal Americans” incarcerated with them toward Japanese American 
soldiers serving in World War II. “In their willingness to stake their lives and fight for 
their native land despite the adversity of their circumstances, they have made known to 
all free men who are fighting a new and rich concept of American democracy.”5 
Newspaper staff, though undoubtedly writing for inhabitants of the camp, very likely 
shaped their publications with an eye toward the War Relocation Authority 
administrators of the camp. Expressions of patriotic loyalty while incarcerated became 
one important aspect of many incarcerees’ negotiations for citizenship. The United States 
government and the American public heavily scrutinized Japanese American loyalty 
while removing their access to basic rights, revealing the creation of a different class of 
citizens and noncitizens based solely upon national origin. In the eyes of the American 
public and its government, Japanese Americans needed to work harder, endure more, and 
fulfill higher standards in exchange for an inferior version of citizenship and belonging.6 
Citizenship was not guaranteed. Unlike white Americans, they needed to prove they 
deserved it. Japanese Americans understood that their acquiescence to fulfilling these 
requirements could mean the difference between freedom and prison.  
 The editors’ reference to a “new concept” of American democracy and 
Murayama’s articulation of loyalty form snapshots of the tenuous nature of Japanese 
American citizenship during World War II and the specific parameters drawn around 
their limited access to basic rights and protections. These parameters—expressions of 
cultural and political Americanism—posed loyalty as a prerequisite for belonging. 
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Incarceration bore significance for citizenship and, more broadly, limited access to 
former homes, family, community, employment, and security. In other words, it deprived 
them of access to both the physical and psychological dimensions of home as they 
previously experienced them. It stole the security of wealth and employment, and left 
them with the unsettling knowledge that their place in the world and relationship with 
their family and community could be taken again at a moment’s notice. Indeed, 
incarcerees entered camps not knowing what else lay in store for them. Confronted with 
the increasingly conditional nature of their belonging in the United States, many Japanese 
Americans defended their claim to their future in America. Citizenship status obviously 
did not differentiate them enough to prompt their release from camp, so they leaned on 
political and cultural expressions of Americanism. Often, this appeared in the form of 
nationalist sentiment and expressions of loyalty. Proclamations of loyalty, as expressed in 
this anniversary edition of Tule Lake’s newspaper, were not uncommon in incarceration. 
Faced with escalating discrimination and virulent prejudice, members of the Japanese 
American community leveraged their position as “loyal” Japanese American citizens in 
order to preserve their rights and autonomy in the United States.  
Many incarcerees seized upon the language of loyalty and American identity in an 
effort to demonstrate categorical allegiance and ward against further acts of aggression 
and discrimination from their own government. This chapter aims to examine the ways 
that Japanese Americans themselves viewed and navigated the issues of citizenship and 
language of loyalty amidst the narrow choices their incarceration posed. Japanese 
Americans exercised agency during World War II, often by defining their identities in 
ways deemed most acceptable by the United States government, in order to negotiate the 
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best possible outcomes for their future. They defined loyalty and citizenship for 
themselves in order to regain access to home. 
Prominent leaders in the U.S. government distinguished the importance of 
“loyalty” as a gauge of the danger that Japanese Americans posed. In the preliminary 
intelligence report for the president on the “Japanese situation” on the West Coast, 
government investigators denied the probability of espionage due to their evaluation of 
the Japanese American community as overwhelmingly loyal.7 Their report and other 
reports like theirs, however, ran contrary to the those of the Western Defense Command 
(WDC). As the army command responsible for defense of the West Coast during WWII, 
the WDC’s reports ultimately held the most influence, and it assumed responsibility for 
carrying out President Roosevelt’s executive order. General DeWitt expressed his doubt 
at the power of “Americanization” due to “the ties of race, the intense feeling of filial 
piety and the strong bonds of common tradition, culture and customs.”8 He concluded 
that it would be impossible to identify the loyal from the disloyal. 
 Japanese Americans, then, aimed to make their loyalty irrefutable. Their 
utilization of these externally imposed prerequisites for belonging, therefore, signifies an 
important moment of distinctly Japanese American ethnic identity formation. They 
adopted the language used in establishing discriminatory parameters. This adoption 
demonstrates that these individuals recognized the shape of the system judging them. 
This is not to doubt the sincerity of Japanese American expressions of loyalty to the U.S. 
but to recognize that—unlike other Americans expressing their wartime nationalism at 
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the time—they did so from behind barbed wire fences.9 Loyalty took on new meaning 
when expressed from within incarceration camps. The ways that Japanese Americans 
utilized the rhetoric of loyalty and nationalism, therefore, sheds light on the shifting 
nature of these parameters as those outside and within the Japanese American community 
continually reshaped and reinforced them.  
 Murayama’s poem, while perfectly exemplifying these strategies, provides insight 
into Tule Lake’s incarceration camp as a particularly potent site of negotiations over 
loyalty and citizenship. One of the ten camps established across the United States, Tule 
Lake lay on the eastern border of Oregon and California. It quickly gained a reputation as 
the primary site of civil unrest and potential danger due to a number of labor strikes and 
wider resistance to the loyalty questionnaire and the military draft. In July 1943, the 
WRA officially designated Tule Lake as the one and only segregation center and began 
transferring all Japanese Americans deemed disloyal to its location. Murayama wrote and 
published her poem only a couple months earlier amidst the turmoil of the loyalty 
questionnaire, as Tule Lake’s reputation sank further in the eyes of the nation.10 Read in 
this context, her poem reads as a plea of recognition and condemnation of those 
“wavering hearts” that stigmatized the camp in which she made her stand for citizenship. 
While this poem provides a snapshot of the kinds of fears prevalent in Tule Lake at this 
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time, the narrative presented here also exemplifies more broadly the strategies for 
survival that continued throughout the war as Japanese Americans faced their uncertain 
future in America. These strategies hinged upon a specific, exclusionary definition of 
loyalty and, by extension, citizenship.   
Perceptions of Japanese Americans as a distinct and homogenous group amplified 
the burden of their representation. The decision to identify themselves as loyal Americans 
became normative—supposedly indicative of the character of Japanese Americans and a 
central tenant of many individuals’ argument for acceptance back into the fold of 
American society. Popular discourse pitted “loyal” Japanese Americans against those 
who did not fit or chose not to fit that mold. However, individuals did not chose to 
declare loyalty or serve the war effort in a vacuum. They discussed these decisions with 
friends, neighbors, and leaders in their community.  
The Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) exerted influential presence in 
the camps. It became an important figurehead and influential organization in shaping 
hegemonic definitions of loyalty that aimed to aid those willing to or able to fulfill that 
definition.11 The concept of loyalty as a prerequisite to belonging in the United States did 
not originate with the JACL, nor does the organization hold responsibility for the fate of 
those that did not or could not engage in their strategies. Those who employed these 
strategies did so to maneuver a system stacked against them from the start. The JACL 
faced the decision to either take a stand against the government and lose the legitimacy 
and bargaining power they held in the eyes of the government or adopt the state’s stance 
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on loyalty in the hopes of achieving safety and citizenship for as many Japanese 
Americans as possible. They chose the latter as a pragmatic choice to an impossible 
situation. 
 While the JACL’s influence should not be overstated, the group’s adoption of the 
state’s definition of loyalty in order to rescue Japanese American citizenship should be 
examined as one of many important factors in the creation of discourse around Japanese 
American loyalty and citizenship during World War II. The group’s influence is 
significant because of the way it demonstrated Japanese Americans’ use of state 
discourse that outlined an inferior version of citizenship to secure their future. These 
processes reveal the way that citizenship is a continually evolving category, shaped and 
reinforced both by internal and external expressions of meaning, the correlation between 
loyalty and citizenship, and the drawing of legal and social boundaries in order to declare 
belonging—boundaries that simultaneously defined the contours of those deemed 
unworthy of belonging. The JACL engaged in tactics that aimed to negotiate the best 
possible outcomes in the context of wartime hysteria and the group members’ own 
incarceration that, regardless of intentionality, supported the state’s definition of 
citizenship and distanced “disloyal” Japanese Americans from the ranks of “loyal” 
Japanese Americans.  
The creation of the Tule Lake segregation camp as a central location for all those 
incarcerees that gave unsatisfactory answers to the loyalty questionnaire facilitated this 
distinction. Following the designation of Tule Lake as a segregation camp, its incarcerees 
comprised the most visible and vilified aberrant group of “disloyals” during World War 
II; they were held apart, an oppositional example to other Japanese Americans’ loyalty 
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and a token of justification for the states’ unfounded, discriminatory policies. The 
polarization of the Japanese American community, then, held particular potency in Tule 
Lake. Before Tule Lake’s designation as a segregation camp, the poet, Sada Murayama, 
and a fellow incarceree, Perry Saito, served as artistic directors of the Little Theater. The 
Little Theater, a theater group that put on classic dramas from a range of Western genres, 
received support by camp administrators for its assimilationist message.12 Expressions of 
cultural Americanism became a popular way for incarcerees to illustrate loyalty. Their 
theater existed alongside groups that celebrated Japanese culture. Following Tule Lake’s 
transition to a segregation center, though, their theater group ended its run.13 Murayama 
and others who framed their arguments in terms of loyalty likely transferred to another 
camp or received clearance to settle in the Midwest or East Coast. Their departure from 
camp and the subsequent stigma attached to Tule Lake demonstrated the limitations of 
Japanese American articulations of citizenship detached from ideas of loyalty. The 
processes by which individuals reshaped Japanese American ethnic identity in the United 
States during the war worked to the advantage of some, and excluded others from their 
fold. 
 Conflict over Japanese American belonging in the United States was not new in 
the 1940s. Japanese immigrants came to the United States in increasing numbers in the 
late twentieth century. The majority of this group settled along the West Coast and in the 
territory of Hawaii and occupied a range of occupations, mostly in the fishing, canning, 
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and agricultural industries.14 Japanese immigrants met with widespread resistance to their 
presence in the country and participation as full citizens. In 1906, San Francisco’s school 
board decided to segregate their schools—removing Japanese American students to the 
school for Chinese Americans, who had already been barred from attending public 
school.15 As a response, the United States negotiated the Gentlemen’s Agreement in 1907 
in order to decrease the number of Japanese men immigrating to the United States. The 
diplomatic agreement was negotiated with Japan rather than written into federal law. The 
status of Japan as a rising imperial and global power remained intricately linked to 
America’s attitude toward and treatment of Japan’s immigrant communities in the United 
States. The agreement reflected the United States’ desire to maintain a friendly 
relationship with Japan, while appeasing strong anti-Japanese sentiment in America. 
Anti-Japanese sentiment was preceded by strong anti-Chinese sentiment in the United 
States, which contributed to the construction of “the Oriental” and restrictive immigration 
legislation that set a precedent for the treatment and racialization of Japanese 
immigrants.16 Other legislation, including California’s Alien Land Law and the 
Immigration Acts of 1917 and 1924 aimed to limit immigration from Japan and prevent 
naturalization and land ownership. Although most of the Issei did not hold the legal title 
of citizen, this status can be attributed to the long legacy of racialized and discriminatory 
immigration policies.17  
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By the time of their incarceration, many Issei Japanese Americans had lived in the 
United States for decades, building their families, businesses, and lives with every 
intention to stay; presumably, many would have become naturalized citizens if they had 
been legally allowed.18 As it was, many Issei depended on their children’s citizenship 
status in order to own land. In the months leading up to Pearl Harbor, members of the 
Japanese American community demonstrated awareness of escalating tension and their 
tenuous position in American society. Already, Japanese American declarations of 
loyalty dotted newspapers in the fall of 1941.19 They demonstrated acute awareness of 
their perceived connection to their country of national origin.  
 These legal and social legacies pertaining to citizenship and belonging leading up 
to World War II demonstrate the tenuous nature of Japanese Americans’ positions in the 
United States and reveal the stakes and imagined futures of their negotiations. Japanese 
Americans, however, occupied various positions of dual culturalism and nationalism that 
complicated the ways they drew upon shared elements of past discrimination and of the 
language of citizenship and loyalty. Dual or migrant nationalism does not necessarily 
mirror nationalism in the community’s country of origin, nor does dual culturalism 
necessarily reflect the culture in their country of origin. These concepts embody the range 
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of ways in which immigrant communities retain and express nationalism and culture.20 
Japanese Americans maneuvered these legacies in the context of war and the continuing 
oppression of the state; those who tempered their claims to the rights of citizenship put 
them in opposition to those who protested their treatment on the grounds of citizenship. 
The state ultimately drew upon this factionalism to support the idea that loyalty was a 
measurable, reliable quality that could be used to predict individual actions and determine 
that individual’s rights within the United States.  
“Evacuation” orders uprooted all Japanese Americans from the West Coast 
between March and August of 1942, but the WRA soon realized the enormous task of 
building and maintaining ten incarceration centers. Almost as soon as the camps opened, 
they began to authorize some individuals’ release and “resettlement” in the interior or 
eastern areas of the country on the condition of loyalty. The WRA posed themselves as 
allies of loyal Japanese Americans. They pursued a policy of dispersal—an early strategy 
proposed by President FDR that involved breaking up Japanese American community 
and dispersing loyal members of population throughout the United States.21 Beginning in 
spring 1942, the WRA authorized a small number of incarcerees for “seasonal” leave in 
order to help with local harvesting. Economic and political pressure from the agricultural 
industry in response to the labor shortage during the war influenced the WRA’s decision 
to release a controlled population of incarcerees for work. Soon, the leave program 
facilitated Japanese Americans’ release to a variety of other industries and occupations. 
By the spring of the next year, camps began to release incarcerees who found colleges 
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and jobs in areas in the interior United States willing to take them. Stringent FBI 
background checks determined whether or not their release was “safe.”22  
Only after the Western Defense Command and the WRA had completed the 
evacuation of all Japanese Americans from the West Coast did these agencies pause to 
consider how to maintain the system they put in place. One of President Roosevelt’s 
public statements in February 1943 indicates the way his administration decided to 
reframe incarceration. “No loyal citizen of the United States should be denied the 
democratic right to exercise the responsibilities of his citizenship, regardless of his 
ancestry…Americanism is a matter of the mind and heart; Americanism is not, and never 
was, a matter of race or ancestry.”23 This statement distinguishes loyalty as the most 
significant feature of American citizens and denied race-based discrimination. This 
distinction proved crucial to justifying incarceration and its continuation. If all Japanese 
Americans were “loyal,” then “evacuation” had served no logical purpose for America; if 
“disloyals” could be distinguished, however, it justified incarceration as a preventative 
measure and built trust in the government’s ability to sort out “loyal” individuals for 
resettlement. The success of the resettlement program, therefore, hinged upon the 
creation of a definitive group of “disloyal” Japanese Americans in order to justify the 
WRA’s release of “loyal” Japanese Americans.24 Their solution for determining how to 
sort incarcerees came in the form of the infamous loyalty questionnaire, which sorted out 
those who failed to participate in or embody hegemonic ideas about loyalty.  
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 The WRA’s distribution of the four-page questionnaire began early in 1943 and 
represented a departure from the logic of unconditional evacuation from the West Coast. 
However, the logics of “evacuation” under the guise of national security were always 
inconsistent. The racially-motivated, exclusionary nature of incarceration peeked through 
from the start. For example, the government did not begin implementation of removal 
until five months after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Had the threat been as imminent as 
they portrayed it, immediacy would have been an essential element of removal. 
Additionally, Japanese Americans were removed from the West Coast, but not from 
Hawaii where the attack actually took place. Japanese Americans made up over a third of 
Hawaii’s population, and—while FDR implemented martial law for almost three years—
it proved impractical and expensive to remove essential players in Hawaii’s economy.25 
From the very beginning, holes formed in the government’s professed reasons for 
incarceration.  
Indeed, the implementation of the loyalty questionnaire threatened some of the 
fundamental assumptions of removal. The form was originally created to determine the 
loyalty of Japanese American men of the appropriate age to serve in the U.S. military. 
The government expanded its application to test the loyalty of the entire population, 
changing its original title—“Statement of United States Citizen of Japanese Ancestry”—
to “Application for Leave Clearance.”26 The new title and identical questions from the 
                                               
25 Robinson, By Order of the President.  
26 “Statement of United States Citizen of Japanese Ancestry,” 1943, Ikeda Family Collection, Densho 
Digital Repository, https://ddr.densho.org/media/ddr-densho-72/ddr-densho-72-4-mezzanine-3e26379d38-
a.jpg; “War Relocation Authority Application for Leave Clearance,” 1943, Yamanaka Collection, Densho 
Digital Repository, https://ddr.densho.org/media/ddr-densho-188/ddr-densho-188-5-mezzanine-
948d0f7156.pdf  
  40 
original form created much confusion around the purpose and consequences of the form. 
Whether it was a “statement,” “application,” or “registration”—all terms used to describe 
the form during this period—it famously became known as the loyalty questionnaire. 
This popular title best characterizes the purpose of the form—a purpose that many 
believed to be pointless. General DeWitt, the commanding general of the Western 
Defense Committee and one of the primary advocates for incarceration, argued that 
Japanese American loyalty was impossible to determine—and many agreed with him.27 
Loyalty was considered inscrutable in Japanese Americans.28 Although the government 
entertained the idea of restrictions for German and Italian Americans, they ultimately 
decided against it. The implementation of the loyalty questionnaire, then, contradicted 
these logics. It did, however, open the door for Japanese Americans to claim belonging 
by admitting the existence of provable Americanism.  
 The questionnaire quantified loyalty and lent legitimacy to the implications of the 
divide between “loyal” and “disloyal” factions of Japanese Americans. The questionnaire 
consisted of twenty-eight questions, addressing anything from political affiliation to 
hobbies to travel.29 A statistician named Calvert L. Dedrick devised a point system by 
which to filter out the disloyal, giving a picture of the kind of citizen who would be 
considered for release. Incarcerees received three points if they received their entire 
education in American schools, two points if they were a member of the Boy Scouts, 
Masons, Y.M.C.A, or other clubs recognized as distinctly American, and two points if 
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they were an instructor in an American sport or hobby. Notably, incarcerees received one 
point if they belonged to the JACL, whereas they were “referred” for further evaluation if 
they belonged to any other Japanese organization. The point sheet, however, was mainly 
occupied with characteristics that subtracted points from their “loyalty” scores: they lost 
three points if their father was also incarcerated (a reality for many Nisei that were 
interned alongside their Issei parents), two points for speaking and writing Japanese well 
(as opposed to one point subtracted for “fair” grasp of speaking and writing), and three 
points for having family still living in Japan. They lost points for participating in 
Japanese cultural activities, teaching Japanese language classes, practicing Shintoism or 
Buddhism, reading Japanese newspapers, being a fisherman or radio operator, and for 
ever having traveled to Japan.30 The questionnaire broke down every facet of their daily 
lives and entire histories into a series of points that determined their “loyalty.”  
Authorities within the federal government disagreed about the utility of such a 
questionnaire to determine loyalty. The War Department and the Department of the 
Interior decided to create the Japanese American Joint Board (JAJB) consisting of 
representatives from both departments and the FBI in order to streamline their differing 
stances on loyalty. While the Department of the Interior tended to support less stringent 
requirements, the War Department often pushed for further limitations to Japanese 
American movement within the country.31 They implemented Dedrick’s point system for 
only five weeks before finding it impossible to agree on the quantification of the 
questionnaire answers. The new system used the answers to these questions to group 
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incarcerees into three distinct color groups based on their answers to the questions: white 
for loyal, black for disloyal, and brown for uncertain loyalty status.32 Eventually, the War 
Department took over full responsibility for evaluating the questionnaires. The 
bureaucratic processes by which the JAJB and War Department decided on loyalty status 
demonstrated the difficulty and often arbitrariness in translating transcultural identities 
into quantifiable loyalty.  
 Questions 27 and 29 of the loyalty questionnaire proved most controversial and 
ultimately determined whether or not incarcerees would be transferred to the Tule Lake 
segregation center. These questions asked incarcerees if they were willing to serve in the 
United States military and if they were willing to “swear unqualified allegiance” to the 
United States, forswear any other national loyalties, and defend the country at all costs.33 
These questions left many confused, unsure of what either a “yes” or “no” would bring, 
and afraid of separation from their families or communities. Many women were left 
confused by the possibility of military service, and Issei who had been denied citizenship 
by the United States balked at forswearing their Japanese citizenship in order to become 
stateless individuals—unprotected by any national power and devoid of citizenship 
entirely.34 Some simply felt that they should not be coerced to answer these questions in 
the context of their incarceration.35 It soon became clear, though, that the WRA felt the 
                                               
32 Muller, American Inquisition, 49-51.  
33 “Statement of United States Citizen of Japanese Ancestry,” 1943. Ikeda Family Colletion, Densho 
Digital Repository, http://ddr.densho.org/ddr-densho-72-4/. 
34 For more on the threat of statelessness, see Linda K. Kerber, “Toward a History of Statelessness in 
America,” American Quarterly, 57, no. 3 (Sept, 2005), pp. 727-749.  
35 Muller, Free to Die for their Country, 31-38.  
  43 
incarcerees’ citizenship and their freedom to associate with other incarcerees hinged upon 
their answers—that is, their “correct” answers.  
 In July 1943, following the loyalty questionnaire, the WRA converted Tule Lake 
into a segregation center to hold Japanese Americans that had “failed” their loyalty 
questionnaire, focusing mainly on those final two questions. Tule Lake gained a 
reputation as a site of resistance and discord very early on, as several incidents of labor 
unrest complicated the relationship between incarcerees and administrators of the WRA 
camp. The mis-administration of the loyalty questionnaire and subsequent refusal of 
3,000 Japanese Americans to answer these questions led to further repercussions. The 
camp administrators imprisoned several hundred individuals who refused to answer the 
questionnaire at the Tule Lake isolation center without due process, and Tule Lake ended 
up with the most number of “disloyal” incarcerees of all ten incarceration camps.  
 The publicity projects of the JACL show traces of the government’s proposed 
definition of Japanese American identity. Their implementation specifically impacted and 
excluded those at Tule Lake. The JACL operated as the most visible, cohesive 
organization of Japanese Americans during World War II.36 The organization assumed a 
prominent position to those outside the community and allied itself with the War 
Relocation Authority to prescribe appropriate, cooperative responses to discrimination 
and incarceration. By suggesting appropriate responses and acquiescence to increasingly 
restrictive policies on Japanese American freedoms and echoing the idea of loyalty as the 
ultimate determinant of limited rights of citizenship, the JACL contributed its influence 
to a state system that denied some Japanese Americans’ claim to belonging. Criticisms of 
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the JACL are not new; several Japanese Americans voiced their dissent to the 
organization’s tactics and “exclusivity” during incarceration, and the Japanese American 
student movement of the 1960s also targeted the JACL’s complicity with the United 
States government.37  The divisions the JACL’s stance created ran deep, and Japanese 
Americans have not quickly forgotten the controversial position the JACL held during 
incarceration; as recently as 2002, the JACL issued a formal apology for demonizing 
Japanese American draft resisters and supporting the strongest penalties against them 
during the war.38 Japanese Americans who protested the state’s actions—thereby falling 
outside the definition of a “loyal” American—did not easily forget the lack of protection 
and, in some cases, overt condemnation of the JACL.39 Most notably, the JACL’s 
leadership decided to oppose test court cases during incarceration and denounced draft 
resisters. So, despite the JACL’s intention to secure a better future for Japanese 
Americans in the United States, its role must also be considered in terms of the power 
and consequences of their campaign to hinge their rights on expressions of loyalty and 
belonging. Their campaign contributed to the contours of exclusionary lines that guided 
others’ expressions of loyalty. In its quest to create avenues to belonging, the JACL 
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simultaneously closed off those access points from certain Japanese Americans also 
searching to find their way home again.   
 Though the JACL already focused on increasing Japanese American’s access to 
citizenship via legislation prior to World War II, the group hardened its stance on 
patriotism and loyalty in 1941 as global tension between the United States and Japan 
intensified. Significantly, it hired Mike Masaoka as the executive secretary of the JACL, 
who led an aggressive campaign to improve the public image of Nisei Japanese 
Americans. This campaign can best be characterized by Masaoka’s 1941 “The Japanese 
American Creed,” a statement of patriotism distributed widely by the JACL to members, 
government officials, other organizations sympathetic to its cause, and the media.  
Although some individuals may discriminate against me, I shall never become 
bitter or lose faith, for I know that such persons are not representative of the 
majority of American people. True, I shall do all in my power to discourage such 
practices, but I shall do it the American way—above board, in the open, through 
courts of law, by education, by proving myself to be worthy of equal treatment 
and consideration. I am firm in my belief that American sportsmanship and 
attitude of fair play will judge citizenship and patriotism on the basis of action and 
achievement, and not on the basis of physical characteristics.40  
 
Widely cited by others testifying on the “character” of the Japanese American people, the 
statement appealed to potential allies. Although the statement narrowly defined what it 
meant to be Japanese American, it also suggested the JACL’s strategy: it challenged the 
government to meet them on the “high road”—to embody the same “American” qualities 
it demanded of Japanese Americans during the war. Masaoka thus defined the “American 
way” for both Japanese Americans and other Americans. This creed, adopted as an 
official JACL statement and printed in its booklets for over a decade, also challenged the 
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state to live up to the moral “American” characteristics adopted by Japanese Americans. 
The creed aimed to secure present and future negotiations over Japanese Americans’ 
status in America by defining the “American” way and asking both Japanese Americans 
and their government to play their parts.  
 The JACL founded the organization on the basis of generational identity; it was 
an organization for Nisei citizens and utilized the birthright citizenship of its base to gain 
more leverage. Focusing mainly on issues of citizenship, the JACL excluded Issei and 
Kibei from membership. Membership requirements during wartime reflected the impact 
of the government’s position on loyalty and citizenship. On October 10, 1942 a Nisei 
woman signed the JACL’s Oath of Allegiance in order to join the organization. The oath 
read:  
I, the undersigned, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend 
the Constitution of the United States of American against all enemies, foreign and 
domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I do hereby 
forswear and repudiate any other allegiance which I knowingly or unknowingly 
may have held heretofore; and that I take these obligations freely, without any 
mental reservation whatsoever or purpose of evasion. So help me God.41 
 
The oath for members closely resembles military oaths of today and reflected the JACL’s 
strong stance on patriotism. Interestingly, the infamous loyalty questionnaire would not 
be distributed for another two months after this individual signed this pledge, but—in 
doing so—she essentially recorded her response to what would become the most 
controversial questions of the loyalty questionnaire: questions 27 and 28. These questions 
asked if Japanese Americans were willing to serve their country (in the military or 
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otherwise) and if they were willing to swear unqualified allegiance to the United States.42 
The oath strategically guaranteed that the JACL’s membership fell within the 
government’s definition of desired loyalty, but it also clarified a standard that would be 
impossible for every Japanese American to meet. 
 Despite its best efforts to serve as the face of Japanese American loyalty, the 
JACL’s methods proved unpopular for many incarcerees. Sometimes these conflicts 
resulted in violence, as in the case of Saburo Kido and Fred Tayama. Fellow incarcerees 
attacked both of these JACL leaders at Poston and Manzanar, respectively.43 Still, 
considering the limitation of its membership to Nisei adults, the group exerted a 
significant enough presence in the press, government negotiations, and incarceration 
camps to draw attention to the power of its discourse.  
 The JACL’s leadership understood the relationship between power and 
knowledge, and established their organization as a source of the latter in order to gain the 
former.44 The JACL published bulletins to communicate with different regional chapters, 
their members, and others within ethnic communities. The initial bulletin following 
Executive Order 9066 attempted to assuage fears and rally a calm, cooperative response. 
The group posed itself as an official mediator between Japanese Americans and their 
government and communicated its position as lobbyists and representatives for Japanese 
Americans. In a special bulletin published on February 20, 1942, one day after President 
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Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, Mike Masaoka assured his readership of the 
JACL’s immediate action: “National Headquarters is now asking clarification…and will 
report to you as soon as possible as to its consequences and implications.”45 Despite the 
fact that actual membership in the JACL during World War II waned, the group 
leveraged its close communication with the United States government in order to assure 
Japanese Americans that it was the most authoritative source of information and most 
strategically positioned organization for negotiations.46 In doing so, its leaders hoped to 
use their organization’s power as a citizen’s league to prevent further infractions on the 
rights of Japanese Americans and gain the trust of the government for future negotiations 
concerning their place in society. Additionally, by speaking directly to U.S. bureaucrats, 
the JACL became the primary organization recognized and used as an example of 
cooperation.  
 JACL leaders endorsed continuing faith in the United States government and 
echoed the government’s stance on war as an adequate explanation for the necessity of 
the suppression of basic rights. In response to criticisms leveled at the JACL for 
cooperating with the government, the JACL’s Portland chapter distributed a bulletin on 
April 17, 1942 that defended its priorities. It is not clear precisely which criticism the 
Portland chapter aimed to respond to in this bulletin, but the criticism was very likely 
prompted by the group’s lack of support for Minoru Yasui—a Japanese American man 
arrested in March 1942 for violating curfew and ignoring the exclusion order for 
Portland. His case eventually made it to the Supreme Court, but without the support of 
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the JACL.47 The group held fast in its opposition to these cases, fearing they would draw 
more negative attention.48 It continued a campaign based on unconditional patriotism and 
cooperation. “Our primary consideration as good Americans is the total war effort. 
Individuals and groups are not important when the life of the nation is at stake. We have 
been asked to evacuate from the Pacific coast as a military measure designed to 
strengthen national defense. We will cooperate with the war effort.”49 The Portland JACL 
identified a common goal that, in claiming as its own, aligned the group closely with 
normative American values in order to emphasize the correlation of their Japanese 
American identity and patriotism. The group placed the “nation” above any other 
concerns of the Japanese American community and associated this prioritization with 
their identity as “good Americans.” This phrase—“good American”—echoes others like 
it in official announcements and booklets of the JACL.50 They identify these “good” or 
“loyal” Americans as members of the collective “we.” Those unwilling to prioritize 
commitment to the war effort via incarceration, then, located themselves outside of the 
“we" represented by the JACL to the government and wider public. Those who aligned 
themselves within the JACL’s vision of loyalty became part of a specific idea of “the 
loyal Japanese American” within broader discourse.  
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 The JACL published a pamphlet presenting the organization’s position and work 
in the latter years of the war with the title, “JACL: An All American Organization of 
American Citizens.” This pamphlet delivered a message of solidarity with the war effort, 
reiterated belief in achieving citizenship through education in American values and 
ideals, and posed the JACL’s position as way to achieve an “enlightened public 
conscience” and secure future benefits for Japanese Americans.51 It also responded to 
accusations of the JACL’s complicity with racist policies against its own community. 
Much like the Portland JACL defended its position in the case of Minoru Yasui, the 
national chapter defended against these accusations by framing its argument as distinctly 
American. The pamphlet described the JACL’s commitment to its message by saying that 
the group “holds fast its faith in the American precept of individual merit and loyalty as 
the only true criterion and believes that discrimination against loyal Americans based 
purely on ancestry or religion undermines national unity and endangers the rights of all 
citizens.”52 The JACL posed American values of self-determination and patriotism as 
essential prerequisites for determining whether individuals received protection from 
discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity. It condemned discrimination, but only 
toward those deemed loyal. Ultimately, the stakes of discrimination applied only within 
the realm of citizenship—citizenship based upon the “only true” criteria of loyalty—
because the people who qualified as good, loyal citizens were the only people the JACL 
could realistically afford to protect under the circumstances.  
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 One of the ways the JACL defined loyalty was through describing ways in which 
Japanese Americans could be loyal to the United States government. Definitions of 
loyalty often called upon more existential and romantic conceptions of American values; 
the call to place trust in the government, to “face it with FAITH—faith in our government 
and faith in our God,” aligned the government with those American values.53 Rather than 
defining loyalty simply in terms of experiences and cultural values as Americans, the 
JACL associated loyalty with Japanese Americans’ willingness to wait—wait for the war 
to end and for the U.S. government to recognize their rights and privileges. Beneath this 
message on the necessity of loyalty lay the JACL’s own pragmatic goals to wait out the 
state’s abuse of power during the war. By urging Japanese Americans to wait, the JACL 
aimed to delay concrete debate over citizenship until a time at which it could bargain 
from a more powerful position.54 In the meantime, however, this tactic relied upon their 
ability to obstruct other forms of resistance that arose in response to the legal and 
constitutional grounds upon which America pursued incarceration.   
Alternative forms of resistance, though, carved out space and time for other 
incarcerees to assert control and claim belonging. A month after Yasui was arrested in 
Portland, Oregon, Gordon Hirabayashi reported himself to the FBI office in Seattle, 
Washington, on account of his intention to violate both curfew and the exclusion law. 
Fred Korematsu was arrested almost a month later in San Francisco for attempting to 
disguise his racial identity and disregard the exclusion order. All three of these test cases 
presented viable arguments, yet the Supreme Court upheld both the curfew and the 
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exclusion orders due to the importance of establishing a secure military area; they 
prioritized the war effort and, in the process, rationalized the principle of racial 
discrimination. Despite the potentially pivotal nature of these cases, the JACL made its 
opposition to the defendants clear. Test cases, the group argued, posed a threat to the 
status of Japanese Americans everywhere.55 The JACL’s continuing opposition to forms 
of legal and overt resistance reflected their understanding of the power of representation 
in America; the actions of one Japanese American could very well be interpreted as 
representative of a large and diverse group. These test cases, however, challenged the 
very homogenization that the JACL intended to use to its advantage. They gave voice to 
different methods of resistance among the ranks of Japanese Americans.  
Labor strikes, the most famous of which occurred at Tule Lake, Manzanar, and 
Heart Mountain, were another way in which some groups exerted control over 
incarceration camps. After a farming accident at Tule Lake that resulted in five injuries 
and one death, incarcerated farmworkers went on strike in October 1943 to protest the 
substandard working conditions at the newly established segregation camp.56 Although 
the WRA broke the strikes by bringing in workers from other incarceration camps and 
imprisoning the most fervent dissenters in the Tule Lake stockade, strikers’ decision to 
withhold labor at a peak harvest time demonstrates the way that overt resistance aimed to 
reestablish control over their community. While they chose a different strategy than the 
JACL, their actions also attempted to restore a sense of belonging—through working 
conditions and class identity, rather than loyalty.  
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 Many media outlets were quick to use any and all of these cases of dissent as an 
indication that everyone in this racialized category shared the same sentiments. Much of 
the coverage was sensational, typically citing the possibility of a larger pro-Axis network 
and suggesting whatever punishment they felt appropriate.57 Whether or not these news 
articles distinguished between loyal and disloyal incarcerees, which they often did, the 
strikes only stood to affirm the presence of danger and discord within the camps. The 
JACL, then, held valid concerns when it cited these cases as harmful to those helping to 
build the image of Japanese Americans’ collective loyal character. By anticipating and 
strategizing around the challenges posed to building Japanese Americans’ positive public 
image, the JACL demonstrated its strategies in negotiating these external boundaries. At 
the same time, the group’s disavowal of those willing to pursue legal recourse or other 
forms of resistance further distanced themselves from the possibilities these strategies 
offered.    
 The JACL offered an alternative avenue to acceptance as citizens in the United 
States—an avenue wholly contingent upon diligent work to bring about this reality. This 
strategy conveyed the responsibility that Japanese Americans held as individuals to 
protect their tenuous status and to tread delicately when it came to improving that status. 
As an organization, then, the JACL did not protect Japanese Americans’ right to speak 
freely or protest—at least not protest that would contradict the image of the 
unquestionably loyal Japanese American character they had honed. Importantly, the 
JACL released a bulletin in 1942 that defined its ultimate goal to “defeat these powers 
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which seek to destroy” the privileges and rights of citizenship.58 The JACL recognized 
outright the severity of these violations, yet posed them as a test of their values as 
citizens—one that some passed, and others failed.  
  Military service carried significant ideological power during World War II. The 
entire country mobilized to aid in the war effort; military service and employment in the 
military industrial sector came to signify American patriotism and loyalty throughout the 
United States. After Pearl Harbor, most military units dismissed Japanese Americans 
from their ranks in fear of sabotage. Exclusion from the draft and dismissal from the 
military demonstrated the removal of a central tenant of citizenship: “the obligation to 
risk one’s life in military service, to submit to being placed in harm’s way when the state 
chooses.”59 Many Nisei men opposed the idea of serving the country currently 
incarcerating them and their families.60 But the JACL saw military service as an 
opportunity for Japanese Americans to reclaim this aspect of citizenship. The group 
strategized military service as a site on which Japanese Americans could stake their 
loyalty and demand the rights of citizenship by demonstrating their willingness to fulfill 
the obligations of citizenship. Military service also held powerful symbolic meaning that 
Japanese American men could not access from the camps. In discussing the legacy of 
military service as an opportunity typically reserved for white men to seek honor, 
historian Linda Kerber observes: “Manliness and honor were sharply and ritually 
contrasted with effeminacy and dishonor.”61 Despite the coerced nature of service during 
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the draft, that service still held powerful ideological potential to challenge race and 
gender stereotypes. Cognizant of the potential for shaping perceptions of Japanese 
American loyalty, the JACL lobbied the War Department to accept Japanese American 
volunteers.62  
When Nisei men did not immediately jump at the opportunity to volunteer, the 
War Department reinstated the draft in the camps. Already stripped of their homes, 
livelihoods, belongings, and rights, the government asked them, once again, to prove they 
belonged. Japanese American men served in a segregated unit, the 442nd Regimental 
Combat Unit. This segregated unit came about largely due to lobbying within the 
Japanese American community and their supporters. Their justification for creating a 
separate unit for Nisei soldiers was to use their military service to improve public opinion 
of Japanese Americans and bolster their claims of loyalty.63 They distributed pamphlets 
and newspapers filled with pictures and descriptions of Japanese American contributions 
to the war effort.64 These pamphlets and other statements on loyalty built upon materials 
released by the WRA and contributed to building a hegemonic definition of Japanese 
American loyalty and citizenship.65  
 During this contentious period of registration and calls for volunteers, from 
February through June 1943, Tule Lake incarcerees watched their camp’s reputation 
decline due to charges of disloyalty. They articulated their disbelief, outrage, and 
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expectations in ways that demonstrated their awareness of the stakes of this charge and 
the risks it posed to their futures as citizens. They clarified their position from within the 
boundaries of acceptable definitions of loyalty, reconciling their hurt and their hopes for 
the future by envisioning a new version of citizenship for themselves. By reimagining 
their role in a larger battle for citizenship, they exercised resiliency and autonomy as they 
pursued the best possible outcomes for themselves. Incarceration camp newspapers and 
magazines contain rich examples of Japanese Americans’ perspective on loyalty. It is 
important to consider the potential censorship involved in the publishing of these sources, 
because these were public sites of Japanese American expression available to camp 
administration, and the Nisei leadership within the camps often used their influence to 
shape public narratives.  
 At times, these newspapers expressed vehement support for their government and 
seized upon mythic notions of the American West in order to frame their position in a 
patriotic light. Yoshima Shibata wrote a piece in the Tulean Dispatch in November 1942 
that describes incarcerees’ experiences at Tule Lake as reminiscent of American settlers’ 
experience. He titled his piece “This is Our Colony” and frames Japanese Americans’ 
present circumstances as “a rare experience unparalleled in American History, placing the 
will of man to an acid test…let us make this Colony a growing concern with life and 
happiness, to prove now and forever, that we are worthy of being loyal Americans.”66 He 
went on to declare that the success of their “colony” depended upon their ability to adopt 
a “positive and constructive” attitude. He likens incarcerees to other “great men” that, 
because of their actions in response to dissatisfactory circumstances, stood on the 
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precipice of greatness.67 Framing incarceration camps as “colonies” and invoking tropes 
reminiscent of the “bootstrap” myth represented their experience in incarceration as 
echoes of other quintessentially “American” narratives.68 Shibata, like the JACL, posited 
loyalty as something they had to create. Incarceration provided the battle ground upon 
which they could fight to prove they belonged. Citizenship, then, meant the utilization of 
certain, meaningful tropes in order to align and ground their experience with the 
experiences with those of white Americans of the past to demonstrate loyalty.  
 Another writer, Riley O’Suga, centered his identity within American values 
through his anger, frustration, and disillusionment at his exclusion from military service 
and America itself. Through this piece, O’Suga’s frustration at his status as a second-
class citizen contrasted with poetic expression about America—of his home. He 
reconciled the jarring contradictions of his experiences in America—of the “conflicting 
thoughts of love and duty, scorn and indifference” by recognizing parallels in the 
experiences of other people and by recognizing America’s “fallibility.”69 Simultaneously, 
he expressed admiration for the landscapes, people, myths, and culture of America. His 
tumultuous and nostalgic depictions of America resolved in his conclusion: “But with a 
smile, Caucasian friends, now in uniform say, ‘I am your friend. I wish you could join us, 
pal; you’re one of us.’ The horror in my heart is melted away and I smile through tears 
and know.”70 In this way, O’Suga reconciled his incarceration with his strong love for 
America by characterizing his fight to self-acceptance and belonging as the thing that 
                                               
67 Ibid, 4-5.  
68 For more on how the landscape of the American West was invoked as an assimilationist tool, see Chiang, 
Nature Behind Barbed Wire.  
69 Riley O’Suga, “Nisei America: Entrails of a Thought,” Tulean Dispatch 1, no. 8, March 1943, Tulean 
Dispatch Magazine Collection, BANC.  
70 Ibid.  
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makes him American. He expressed hurt over his unrequited love of country and 
accepted responsibility for coming to terms with his feelings of alienation, placing 
himself squarely among other proponents of Japanese American loyalty. This echoes 
similar sentiments expressed by the JACL concerning the attainment of citizenship as a 
journey that must be instigated and facilitated through Japanese American efforts.  
 Several of these accounts, while ultimately reflecting a recognition and 
confirmation of the importance of loyalty, engage meaningfully with crises of belonging. 
Shuji Kimura, another incarceree at Tule Lake, reflected on the relationship between 
belonging and loyalty in his reflection on question 28—the loyalty question:  
Loyalty in our hearts means having known the bitterness of contempt: the lie, 
“Sorry, we’re full right now”; having known the poverty of the farms, the squalor 
and the smells of the city; the helplessness against men who sit in legislatures 
passing laws to drive us from our farms, from our jobs. It means remembering the 
pain of auctions before pitiless spectators.71 
 
For Kimura, the experience of feeling rejected, different, and without the sense that they 
belonged in America was intricately intertwined with loyalty. His and his fellow 
incarcerees’ identities as Japanese Americans brought about these special “tests” to their 
loyalty. Kimura posited the loyalty required from them as distinct—present despite a 
multitude of injustices carried out against Japanese Americans. 
 In July 1943, the WRA began transferring Japanese Americans who had refused 
to answer the loyalty questionnaire or had answered “no and no” on the crucial questions 
27 and 28 to the newly established segregation center at Tule Lake. It eventually 
incarcerated more Japanese Americans than any other camp—18,000 people, all branded 
as dangerous and unworthy of basic rights and freedoms according to standards of loyalty 
                                               
71 Shuji Kimura, “Question 28” Tulean Dispatch 1, no. 9, April 1943, Tulean Dispatch Magazine 
Collection, BANC.  
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created by the WRA and reinforced by organizations and influencers such as the JACL. 
On the eve of segregation, people published their agreement with this definition of 
loyalty as they aimed to distance themselves from this newly discernible stigma. The 
Tule Lake segregation center became disloyalty incarnate and reaffirmed the kinds of 
dialogues that categorized incarcerees as loyal and disloyal.  
 Tule Lake incarcerees Yoshima Shibata, Riley O’Suga, Shuji Kimura, and Sada 
Murayama all wrote during months when tensions at Tule Lake arose over a series of 
labor strikes that started in August 1942 and ended with entire barracks of people 
refusing to complete registration in the spring of 1943. While the historical record does 
not detail these writers’ involvement in these events, it is clear that all of them engaged 
with the language of loyalty to frame their own concerns and arguments. The strength of 
these ideas, externally imposed by an oppressive system and made hegemonic through 
internal Japanese American negotiations for security and citizenship, all came to a head at 
Tule Lake. Loyalty categories influenced the stigma that the place and the people 
incarcerated at Tule Lake carried and would drastically narrow the options and arguments 
left to those people consigned to remain there. The normative expressions and definitions 
of loyalty became a part of the process whereby these exclusionary lines around 
citizenship hardened. Most importantly, perceived loyalty often directly influenced the 
extent to which incarcerees were uprooted from legal, social, and physical belonging in 
the United States. Those unprepared or unwilling to adopt this vision of citizenship, then, 
found themselves vilified and subjugated in more ways than one.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
ON THE ROAD (AGAIN): PATTERNS OF JAPANES AMERICAN FORCED  
IMGRATION AND LOSS DURING “VOLUNTARY EVACUATION,” 
SEGREGATION, AND RESETTLEMENT  
On August 7th, 1942, after residing in the central California town of Fowler for 
five months, seventeen-year-old Akira Jackson Kato and his family packed up their 
remaining belongings and boarded a train for an unknown destination. Following a long 
train ride through central and eastern California in the height of summer heat, the Kato 
family was finally informed of their destination: Gila River, Arizona—home to one of the 
ten incarceration camps throughout the country at the time. Their forced removal during 
the scorching summer came months after the Japanese Americans entered the first 
detention facilities in March 1942. The uncertainty of their destination and the losses 
incurred upon their exclusion from the West Coast’s “red zone” was not uncommon for 
Japanese American families at the time. And yet their brief residence in Fowler preceding 
their forced removal highlights a unique chapter in their experience of incarceration. 
Following the announcement of Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942, the Kato 
family decided to “voluntarily relocate” from their farm in El Monte, southern California, 
to the San Joaquin Valley in central California to avoid exclusion and incarceration.1 
Only a few months later the military expanded the western exclusion zone to include 
areas that initially had been safe havens to Japanese Americans.2 The War Relocation 
                                               
1 Akira Jackson Kato, interview by Melina Takahashi, REgenerations Oral History Project: Rebuilding 
Japanese American Families, Communities, and Civil Rights in the Resettlement Era, Volume IV: San Jose 
Region, Online Archive of California, December 19, 1997, 
https://oac.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft600006bb/?brand=oac4. 
2 The Western Defense Command issued Public Proclamation 1 on March 2, 1942, which designated 
Military Areas 1 and 2, stating their intention to “evacuate” only Area 1. By June 6, 1942, the government 
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Authority (WRA) initially organized the removal of the majority of Japanese Americans 
to camps by geographic location, leaving late “evacuees” to be dispersed amongst those 
camps that had not yet reached capacity--often separating them from whatever 
community ties they had to other Japanese Americans. Kato, his parents, and his two 
brothers thus began a pattern of uprooting that followed them throughout their wartime 
incarceration and afterward.  
 Over the course of World War II, the Katos were continually impeded from 
accessing the stability and security of home due to repeated, coerced uprooting. The 
exclusion order compelled their move to Fowler, a small farming community outside of 
the initial exclusion zone. The expansion of the exclusion zone led to the family’s 
incarceration at Gila River, Arizona, and, subsequently, Tule Lake, California. Akira 
Kato attended five different high schools in the space of a year and a half. And his was 
not the only hardship. His younger brother left the hospital at Fowler with a serious case 
of bronchitis in order to prevent separation from his family. Moreover, unable to legally 
own their own farmland in California, his parents sold the only assets they owned 
outright--expensive farm equipment and vehicles--at huge losses despite their efforts to 
escape the reach of the government’s exclusion order. Their movements were constantly 
marred by financial and material loss, and the threat of separation from family. They 
returned after the war only to continue this pattern of impermanence and instability, 
demonstrating the longevity of wartime incarceration on the Katos’ access to home.  
                                               
had forcibly removed all Japanese Americans from Area 1 and issued another set of civilian exclusion 
orders in Area 2. 
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The pattern and frequency of being uprooted throughout and following the Katos’ 
experience of incarceration parallels that of many other Japanese Americans. Upon 
returning to El Monte after the end of the war, in the winter of 1945, they found 
themselves unable to return to the land they formerly leased. The Katos struggled to find 
employment and housing in an unwelcoming community. They stayed with family 
friends for a period of months before moving first to Orosi, then Indio, then--finally--
Santa Clara County.3 Though not everyone experienced repeated displacement in quite 
the same way, every instance of uprootedness in Akira Kato’s life mirrors that of many 
others. His story, while not representative in its specifics of Japanese Americans’ 
experiences during World War II, illuminates patterns that resonate more broadly. 
Japanese American incarceration is already understood as a story of legal and social 
exclusion and expulsion. Movement, or displacement, is inherently part of these 
concepts, yet repeatedly being uprooted from temporary places of rest, comfort, and 
community ties compounded the psychological and economic impacts of expulsion from 
an ideological or national sense of home. These instances of uprooting occurred far more 
often than the “standard” account of migration—from assembly centers to incarceration 
camps to a return to the outside world—would suggest. Additionally, the timeline of 
these coerced movements was not neatly bookended by the opening and closing of 
incarceration camps.  
This chapter explores these frequent patterns of uprootedness by focusing, in part, 
on a set of oral interviews given in the late 1990s in San Jose, California. Because of the 
                                               
3 Akira Jackson Kato, interview by Melina Takahashi, REgenerations Oral History Project: Rebuilding 
Japanese American Families, Communities, and Civil Rights in the Resettlement Era, Volume IV: San Jose 
Region, Online Archive of California, December 19, 1997.  
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predominance of the agricultural industry in this region’s history, most of the people 
interviewed were a part of this industry at some point in their lives. In most cases, these 
individuals remained active in San Jose’s Japanese American community. In addition to 
these oral interviews, this chapter relies on a set of correspondence between Japanese 
Americans and a community activist named Gerda Isenberg, who aided the postwar 
resettlement effort in Palo Alto—a small city about twenty miles north of San Jose. This 
chapter’s analysis, then, focuses on the experiences of a particular community that largely 
grew up in the agricultural industry of the south San Francisco Bay area and central 
California and were willing to tell the story of difficult life experiences.  
 Japanese Americans repeatedly experienced the loss of home—both physical and 
ideological. Beyond forced expulsion from their homes, incarceration stole or challenged 
other abstract notions of home—family or community, a sense of belonging, and trust in 
stability and security. Uprootedness, then, is not a historical experience limited to 
physical movement; rather, it can also apply to the ways in which an individual found 
these other crucial notions of home threatened. Oral interviews and correspondence 
reveal a long, taxing pattern of uprooting and forced migration that extended beyond the 
years of incarceration and burdened this community in their search to reclaim home. 
They reveal that incarceration deprived Japanese Americans of the comfort and stability 
of home—in all its various meanings.  
 
“Voluntary Evacuation” 
Like many other Japanese American families in the United States at the time, 
immigration and citizenship restrictions created the barriers the Kato family faced to 
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employment, land ownership, representation, and inclusion in the national community. 
The son of two Japanese immigrants, Akira Kato was sixteen years old on December 7, 
1941, when Japan’s imperial navy carried out an attack on the United States naval base at 
Pearl Harbor. His family’s position in 1941—as truck farmers growing seasonal produce, 
leasing land, and linked primarily to the local Japanese American social community—
demonstrates both the legal and social legacy of anti-Japanese sentiment during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Limitations on land ownership and 
discrimination in housing and employment led to often tenuous circumstances. Due to the 
California Alien Land Law of 1913, which prohibited Issei from owning land and limited 
their leases to three years, few Japanese American farmers owned land. These restrictions 
and anti-Japanese sentiment led many Japanese Americans to create social and economic 
resources specific to their communities and formed networks of support.4 These 
networks, however, could not alleviate the impact of geopolitical factors. The insularity 
of many of these communities only increased following Pearl Harbor and the ensuing 
chaos. Kato remembers that he quickly withdrew from public life, and his family quickly 
reevaluated the options available to them. Later he remembered, “My friends—well, 
some of them were still friends, but the majority of them, well, they kind of kept their 
distance. So shortly after that, we didn't go back to school.”5 He and his brothers focused 
their energy on distributing produce in order to minimize their losses, especially after 
they learned they would likely be evacuated. The concentration of Japanese Americans 
on the West Coast meant that there were few Japanese Americans willing and able to 
                                               
4 For more on Japanese American farming communities in California, see Matsumoto, Farming the Home 
Place.  
5 Akira Jackson Kato, REgenerations Oral History Project, 186.  
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offer support outside of the contested zone. The dismantling of community networks of 
support during incarceration removed a key resource that Japanese Americans previously 
relied upon to find economic and social stability before the war.  
President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942. The 
executive order gave the military permission to establish zones from which “any or all 
persons may be excluded” and paved the way for Public Proclamation 1, issued ten days 
later on March 2nd. Public Proclamation 1 established Military Areas 1 and 2—the 
former including the westernmost portions of California, Oregon, and Washington, the 
latter covering the easternmost parts of the same states—and indicated that those of 
Japanese descent would be forcefully removed from zone 1.6 In addition to this ominous 
warning, General DeWitt encouraged those living in Military Area 1 to relocate further 
inland to Military Area 2 or the interior states.7 However, it proved impractical for more 
than one hundred ten thousand people to relocate on their own, especially considering the 
fact that the government froze Issei bank accounts in summer of 1941 and most people 
did not have the connections or resources to make such a drastic move on short notice.8 
Furthermore, interior states and inhabitants expressed opposition to opening their states to 
people otherwise being incarcerated by “military necessity.” The window for “voluntary 
evacuation” therefore closed quickly, on March 27, with the issuance of Public 
                                               
6 Executive Order 9066, February 19, 1942, General Records of the Unites States Government, Record 
Group 11, National Archives, accessed through www.ourdocuments.gov; Brian Niiya. “Military Areas 1 
and 2,” Densho Encyclopedia https://encyclopedia.densho.org/Military%20Areas%201%20and%202/. 
7 “Western Defense Command,” Densho Encyclopedia 
https://encyclopedia.densho.org/Western%20Defense%20Command/ 
8 Brian Niiya, “Voluntary evacuation,” Densho Encyclopedia 
https://encyclopedia.densho.org/Voluntary%20evacuation/ 
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Proclamation 4, which prohibited Japanese Americans from moving outside of Military 
Area 1 and put forced removal in motion.9  
The US Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians 
estimated that the number of individuals who were “evacuated” during this time was 
4,889—less than 5 percent of the total number of Japanese Americans later forcibly 
removed by the WRA. Although it is unclear whether this figure included those who 
migrated to Military Area 2 only to be removed later, the experiences of this group rarely 
invoke more than brief mention in scholarly works. Their experiences are significant 
nonetheless, in part, because “voluntary evacuation” represented a stage of uproot not 
captured by discussion of assembly centers. More importantly, “voluntary evacuation” 
represented an option presented to other Japanese Americans in area 1. Even if the 
majority of Japanese Americans chose not to pursue this option, it foreshadowed the trials 
to come and indicated the precarity of their situations.  
Historian Susan J. Matt explores the multiple meanings of home, as a place and an 
idea, in her study of nostalgia and homesickness in America. In discussing the frequency 
of migration in America and its associated ills, Matt theorizes that people’s nostalgia for 
home was informed by the distance created by factors like experience and social class. 
Her analysis conveys the gravity of changing understandings of home and belonging: 
“both they [migrants] and their homes had changed.”10 Japanese Americans sense of 
belonging likely changed before they even left their homes. Despite the fact that many 
                                               
9 General DeWitt issued the first of 108 Civilian Exclusion Orders on March 24, 1942; “voluntary 
evacuation” is a phrase coined by the WRA at that time. I use it here in order to convey one of the ways in 
which forced migration and uprooting was portrayed at the time and to distinguish it from later involuntary 
removal facilitated by government funding and oversight. 
10 Susan J. Matt, “You Can’t Go Home Again: Homesickness and Nostalgia in U.S. History,” The Journal 
of American History 94 (Sept., 2007): 492.  
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Japanese Americans were unable to quickly put their lives and assets in order to move or 
simply chose not to, this intermediary period made it abundantly clear that their homes 
were no longer stable or even their own. Although previous patterns of discrimination 
and exclusion already complicated their position in America, the imminent threat of 
forced removal very likely changed their experience of home before they physically left 
it. Their legal and social status prior to World War II already made it difficult for them to 
feel fully rooted in America; the choice for “voluntary evacuation” likely initiated a new 
sense of uprootedness.  
For those thousands of individuals who left Military Area 1 within the three and a 
half week window, uproot took on a more literal meaning. Kato’s older brother stayed 
behind to sell what he could of their remaining crop, accepting his imminent 
incarceration and separation from his family in order to ensure their financial security, 
while the rest of the family fled to central California with another Japanese American 
family. Shared or temporary living situations were not uncommon among those who left 
the West Coast in March 1942. The Katos lived in their truck—the only vehicle of four 
that they kept—as they moved northeast looking for employment and housing. 
“Voluntary evacuees” utilized networks of other Japanese Americans moving east. When 
the Katos eventually arrived in Fowler, California, they split a converted chicken coop 
with the other family that had traveled from El Monte with them. Other “voluntary 
evacuees’” experiences echoed these patterns. Katie Hironaka lived in Santa Clara 
County up until the war began and chose to leave with her parents-in-law and her 
husband’s seven siblings to escape incarceration. Her husband, who served in the 
military, was absent at the time. She recalls leaving with a group of families in the middle 
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of the night for the town of Selma, in Fresno County. They slept on the floor of an 
acquaintances’ garage with four or five other families before they found temporary 
housing in Reedley with no running water or bathroom. Hironaka was several months 
pregnant with her first child.11  
Although several larger planned “voluntary evacuations” fell through, Hironaka 
and Akira Kato’s experience of leaving with members of their community demonstrate 
the collaborative element of many families’ migrations.12 If they did not travel with other 
families, some people journeyed to live with acquaintances in other states. Hatsu 
Kanemoto grew up in San Jose and, as the eldest of twelve children in a sharecropping 
family, experienced significant hardship throughout her childhood and early adulthood. 
Both her and her husbands’ families decided to leave California to avoid incarceration, an 
option open to them because Kanemoto’s father knew a Japanese American man who had 
established a farm in Colorado. Ultimately, the arranged situation fell through when it 
became clear that the acquaintance did not plan to compensate Kanemoto’s family for 
their work on his farm.13 Regardless, their experience illustrates the kinds of 
arrangements and accompanying unpredictability that facilitated movement away from 
the coast during in this short window of opportunity.  
                                               
11 Katie T. (Koga) Hironaka, interview by Barbara K. Uchiyama, REgenerations Oral History Project: 
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Many of those who “voluntarily evacuated” likely left with the knowledge that 
they would struggle to find a permanent home for a long while. Beyond structural 
barriers such as discrimination in housing and employment and state governments 
unwilling to offer support for resettlement, the protean nature of the military’s stance on 
Japanese Americans on the West Coast created uncertainty as to how far the Western 
Defense Command would go to restrict their rights. As the army command responsible 
for the defense of the West Coast, the WDC held complete power to compel Japanese 
American movement.14 However, the WDC did not always make their ultimate goals or 
tactics clear. Rumors, frequently revised notices, and an increasingly hostile environment 
made it unclear as to what Japanese Americans’ future in the United States would look 
like. The extent to which the U.S. government would “exclude and remove” them and the 
potential longevity of this process was not clear.  
Specifically, they did not know how far they had to go to truly escape their 
forcible removal.  Proclamation 1 indicated that the military did not “contemplate any 
prohibition or regulation or restriction except with respect to the zones established 
therein,” giving people the impression that they could remain on the West Coast as long 
as they moved far enough east.15 Contrary to this indication, the WDC would later go on 
to declare all of Military Area 2 within California subject to civilian exclusion orders. 
Paul Sakamoto, a Nisei Japanese American who grew up in a San Jose farming 
community and fled the West Coast with his family, recalls his parents’ attempt to outrun 
                                               
14 Executive Order 9066 gave the military power to remove or exclude “any or all persons” based on 
“whatever restrictions” the Secretary of War and military commanders imposed.  
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residents are no longer allowed, March 2, 1942, Special Collections, University of Washington Libraries, 
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the shifting wartime policies: “My parents had the idea that we would sell everything, 
and buy a lot of dried foods, folding furniture, and put us on a big truck and keep moving 
until it was safe, that we would not be evacuated. But unfortunately, they moved into the 
line of fire.”16 They moved to Lodi, a town in the California’s San Joaquin Valley, 
believing that moving to Military Area 2 would save them from forcible removal. The 
WDC changed its stance on eastern California, though, and incarcerated them in the 
Stockton Assembly Center soon after they arrived. Paul Sakamoto’s impression of his 
parents’ intention in moving him and his ten siblings involved foregoing permanent 
resettlement for the sake of escaping incarceration. While it is unclear what prevented the 
Sakamotos from moving further than Lodi, California, Paul Sakamoto’s recollection 
conveys the uncertainty of uprooting their home, essentially gambling on a new location 
in the hopes that they would escape the camps.  
These individuals exerted agency as they navigated the possibility of forced 
removal by choosing the option that seemed most likely to bring about a favorable 
outcome. In the end, “voluntary evacuation” brought about the exact outcome these 
families hoped to avoid. Confusion over the military’s objectives and the limits of their 
financial resources and social connection led many families to “voluntarily relocate” to 
areas from which they were later forcibly removed and incarcerated. Kato, Hironaka, and 
Sakamoto and their respective families found themselves uprooted once more from their 
temporary circumstances in central California when, in June 1942, the WDC began to 
post civilian exclusion orders for Military Area 2. Their “voluntary evacuation” simply 
                                               
16 Paul Sakamoto, interview by Aggie Idemoto,  REegenerations Oral History Project: Rebuilding 
Japanese American Families, Communities, and Civil Rights in the Resettlement Era, Volume IV: San Jose 
Region, Online Archive of California, February 16, 1998.  
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comprised an additional chapter of uprootedness in March 1942. Still, these individuals 
maneuvered their situations and the possibility of incarceration in often unexpected ways. 
For example, once Katie Hironaka discovered that the military planned to incarcerate her 
and her husband’s family, she wrote a letter to General DeWitt explaining that she was 
pregnant and—as her husband was away in the military—wanted to join her own family 
further south in the Pomona Assembly Center rather than the Fresno Assembly Center. 
The army granted her wish and incarcerated her with her family, where she gave birth to 
a baby girl a few weeks later. Hironaka had initially relocated to Fresno County because, 
as she recalls, her husband’s family felt responsible for her and their unborn grandchild’s 
welfare. She reconsidered her decision as she progressed in her pregnancy and as 
incarceration loomed on the horizon: “it was going to be my first child, and I’m with 
family who are actually strangers.”17 Her temporary living situation lacked familiarity, 
comfort, and—with new civilian exclusion orders posted in central California—the safety 
she had initially sought. She approached her impending incarceration with the desire to 
surround herself with a community she felt close to.  
Although there was some continuity in community dynamics, new social 
networks also emerged during incarceration. In discussing the incarceration of the 
inhabitants of the Cortez farming colonies at the Amache camp, historian Valerie 
Matsumoto observes “the strength of support networks formed before and during the war, 
and the continuity of ties of affection and responsibility.”18 The use of geographic zones 
to organize forced removal meant that Japanese Americans living in the same town or 
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region often ended up in the same camps, facilitating this continuation that Matsumoto 
refers to. For those that experienced this continuation, it constituted a source of comfort. 
However, she also details the way camps changed family, gender, and community 
patterns. Individuals spent more time with peers of their own age rather than their family 
units, women gained access to new jobs and higher wages, and new communities based 
on barrack blocks and incarceration camp formed. Regardless of these shifts, new 
communities provided support. Correspondingly, it also constituted a source of regret for 
those who became separated from their community during incarceration. Masayo Arii felt 
as though the splitting of the Japanese American community of Winters, California, 
irreversibly altered the course of her relationships for decades after the war. Her town 
spread across the boundary of two different counties; thus, the WRA sent half of her town 
in Yolo County to Amache, Colorado, and the other half in Solano County to Gila River, 
Arizona. The two halves of the town consequently experienced incarceration separately 
and never reformed community ties after the war. Arii, a musician, became an active 
member of San Jose’s Japanese American community by the late 1990s. Whenever she 
performed in Central California, she recalled seeing people from her old pre-war town. 
“They know me because our town was, I think, split and then they… relocated to 
different towns after the war. So I have a lot of friends that remember me for that reason, 
that our town split.”19 Few communities, including the community of Winters, emerged 
from the war unchanged. She remembers these friends from her childhood fifty years 
after they parted ways and identifies incarceration as the reason that their lives followed 
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different trajectories. Her story demonstrates the link between incarceration and the 
uprooting from community as another way of understanding the loss of home. Paul 
Sakamoto also experienced separation from community as a result of the geography of 
military zones, but as a consequence of “voluntary evacuation.” Sakamoto reflected back 
upon his family’s relocation with regret. In removing them from Military Zone 2, the 
WRA shipped the family to the furthest possible camp in Rohwer, Arkansas, where they 
knew no one. “We were with people from Lodi and Stockton, whereas if we [had] stayed 
here [San Jose], we would have been in Heart Mountain, Wyoming, with our friends.”20 
He reflects upon their decision regretfully, imagining an alternative in which he could 
have experienced incarceration alongside friends. Their decision to leave San Jose in 
1942 resulted in a feeling of uprootedness from both community and place.  
 Furthermore, there is the possibility that the historical archive neglects those who 
“voluntarily relocated” beyond the government’s grasp yet still bore the burden of their 
maligned identities as unassimilable, potentially dangerous Others. Hatsu Kanemoto, the 
woman who moved with her husband and family to Colorado, was never formally 
incarcerated. Yet, her years of exile from the West Coast held innumerable hardships. 
The combination of their racial and ethnic identity and their lower-class status both likely 
influenced the pattern of sharecropping and debt that followed her and her husband in 
Colorado. They regretted their decision to escape incarceration, later ruminating on the 
kinds of support and avenues of resettlement they may have gained through it. When 
asked about her and her husband’s experience of living in Colorado, she responded: “We 
always said it would have been better if we had gone to camp. Then [my husband] 
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could've gone out—or he could've learned a trade while in camp, because some of his 
friends became carpenters or things that were available to learn while in camp. We didn't 
have that opportunity.”21 While others who experienced incarceration would likely object 
to the idea that it presented opportunity, Kanemoto’s words communicate the pain and 
isolation of being uprooted from California. The military compelled their displacement 
and, while they retained their right to move freely around the rest of the country, they lost 
the community support and scant resources afforded those impacted by similar forces. To 
put it simply, the structural inequalities that created the camps did not end at their gates. 
The Kanemotos returned to San Jose as soon as the military lifted the exclusion order. 
Their experience of being uprooted did not garner the same kind of recognition as the 
experiences of those held in incarceration camps. But they, too, returned with the 
understanding that “home” as a Japanese American in the United States was not 
necessarily a guaranteed right—whether or not they “volunteered” to forgo it.  
 “Voluntary evacuation” is a largely ignored period of displacement in the history 
of Japanese American incarceration. As the imminence of their removal became clear, 
these families chose to leave homes and communities in order to try to maintain their 
autonomy. They leaned on networks of support and felt the pain of leaving homes and 
communities behind—just as they would in subsequent instances of coerced migration. 
This movement, then, comprises only the first of several chapters of uprootedness. 
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Migration During the Period of Incarceration  
 On January 20, 1943 the military announced that, in addition to recruiting 
Japanese American Nisei men into military service, it planned to launch an investigation 
into all incarcerees’ loyalty in the process.22 At the time of this announcement, Akira 
Jackson Kato was still seventeen years old and a junior at Canal High School in Gila 
River’s incarceration camp.23 Teams of military personnel dispersed to all ten 
incarceration camps to distribute questionnaires intended to test and categorize Japanese 
American loyalty to the United States. The loyalty questionnaire included the infamous 
questions 27 and 28, which asked respondents whether they were willing to serve in the 
U.S. military and if they promised unconditional loyalty to the United States. The 
distribution and evaluation of questionnaires continued throughout the spring and 
summer of 1943. When Kato turned eighteen in June of 1943, he faced these crucial 
questions along with their unclear consequences. As a young Nisei man, he likely faced 
military service—a path Kato was willing to follow, but which his father expressly 
disapproved of.  
There are many potential reasons why Kato’s father may have felt reluctant for 
his son to serve in the military. Issei parents juggled fears about their own citizenship 
status and their children’s. Barred from U.S. citizenship, many Issei balked at 
forswearing their Japanese citizenship by giving unequivocal “yes-yes” answers to the 
questionnaire—a decision that would render them stateless people. Despite the fact that 
neither Japan nor the U.S. seemed to offer substantive protections for this population 
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during the war, statelessness is a historically vulnerable position to inhabit. Historian 
Linda Kerber theorizes: “The stateless are the citizen’s other. The stateless serve the state 
by embodying its absence…by signaling who will not be entitled to its protection.”24 
Unsure of their future in the U.S., many felt that Japanese citizenship offered an avenue 
to protections and decided to take their chances in the Tule Lake segregation camp rather 
than detach themselves from citizenship. Furthermore, they feared providing answers that 
deviated from their children’s lest they result in separation. The lack of clarity concerning 
the intended targets of the questions and the consequences of their answers contributed to 
widespread anxiety. Question 27 asked if incarcerees were “willing to serve in the armed 
forces of the United States,” without specifying if they were signing up for conscription 
by answering “yes,” and left it unclear as to how women should answer the question. 
Question 28 asked incarcerees to “forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the 
Japanese emperor or any other foreign government, power, or organization” without 
guaranteeing the protection of U.S. citizenship for those that had been legally barred from 
obtaining citizenship after immigrating from Japan.25  
 The criteria for categorizing loyalty, nationalism, and citizenship conflated these 
concepts considerably. As it became increasingly clear that incarceration stood on shaky 
legal and constitutional ground, President Roosevelt and the wartime administration 
aimed to demonstrate a shift from race to loyalty as criteria for incarceration. By 
administering the questionnaire, they hoped to legitimize the existence of the camps as 
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well as initiate the process of dispersing Japanese Americans across the country.26 The 
questionnaire helped to build a foundation for the idea of loyalty as a simple, identifiable 
category equivalent to or indicative of political and cultural nationalism. Historian Mae 
Ngai has argued that migrant or dual nationalism “is produced from complex dynamic 
interactions between official and unofficial outreaches from the nation of origin and the 
various political and affective needs of people living in diaspora.”27 Likely strengthened 
by the political and cultural exclusion of Japanese Americans even prior to incarceration, 
many Japanese Americans maintained a complex political and cultural nationalism that 
helped form their ethnic identity as both part of, and apart from, the United States.28 Dual 
nationalism, however, did not fit easily into wartime categories of loyalty, and neither did 
practical concerns over statelessness and family separation. It is possible, given their 
incarceration and expulsion from the nation’s body of citizens, that Kato’s father believed 
there were legitimate reasons why his son should not be forced to risk his life for his 
country to prove his loyalty. Although this was a sentiment expressed later by Japanese 
American draft resisters, it was deemed unacceptable in an atmosphere of wartime 
nationalism.29 Regardless of his motivations, he urged Kato to answer “no-no” to 
questions 27 and 28. Subsequently, the WRA transferred the Kato family—along with 
individuals from other camps who had answered “no-no” to the loyalty questions—to the 
newly established Tule Lake Segregation Center.  
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Segregation in the fall of 1943 comprised another instance of uproot for several 
thousand Japanese Americans and, regardless of the geographically enforced binary 
created between “loyalty” and “disloyalty,” was a complex process that created a 
tumultuous experience of dislocation for both those leaving and entering Tule Lake. The 
WRA chose to designate Tule Lake a segregation center in July 1943 because of its large 
capacity and the high number of incarcerees deemed disloyal there during the distribution 
of the questionnaire. Unsatisfied with registration personnel’s inability to answer 
clarification questions about the consequences and parameters of the questionnaire, more 
than three thousand people incarcerated at Tule Lake refused to answer the loyalty 
questions affirmatively.30 The total number of people who either refused to complete the 
questionnaire or answered “no” to one or both questions 27 and 28 amounted to forty-two 
percent of Tule Lake’s population at the time. By comparison, only twenty-six percent of 
incarcerees at both Manzanar and Jerome answered “no” to one or both of questions 27 
and 28.31 The army famously imprisoned several hundred young men in county jails and 
the Tule Lake isolation center for refusing to complete the questionnaire. Therefore, Tule 
Lake presented a practical location to incarcerate “disloyal” Japanese Americans from all 
camps. In the end, Tule Lake incarcerated approximately twelve thousand people deemed 
disloyal and another four thousand people who were family members of those deemed 
disloyal. Around eleven hundred “loyal” individuals refused to move to another camp 
and continued to reside in Tule Lake during its phase as a segregation center.32 In the end, 
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around sixteen thousand people experienced another instance of migration as a result of 
the loyalty questionnaire.  
The Tule Lake segregation center was a site of both family unity and disunity. 
Some, like the Katos, transferred to Tule Lake over the issue of military service, as well 
as the threat of statelessness and family separation. Others simply endured separation 
from family members and went through the period of incarceration without knowing 
when or if reunion was possible. One such person who endured this separation during the 
war, a Kibei man, was drafted before the war. His parents, however, spent the war 
incarcerated at the Poston camp in Arizona while his brothers were incarcerated at Tule 
Lake.33 The fracturing of this particular family over the course of the war represents the 
kind of separation that those like the Katos feared.  
Still, others held more radical pro-Japan nationalist ideas or anger toward the 
United States, which often led to repeated movement within the network of detention and 
incarceration facilities the military and the WRA created. Harry Ueno and his family 
lived and worked in Los Angeles and were forcibly removed to Manzanar in 1942. Born 
in Hawaii and educated in Japan, Ueno encountered employment discrimination in 
several cities across the U.S. upon his return. At Manzanar, Ueno worked as a cook and 
led the Mess Hall Workers Union. His activism in the union led to conflict with camp 
administration and the JACL, which frequently positioned itself in opposition to overt 
forms of resistance in the camps.34 When a local JACL leader Fred Tayama was found 
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beaten severely in December 1942, the camp administration accused Harry Ueno and two 
other men of their involvement. The accusation led to a camp riot that resulted in two 
deaths and Ueno’s incarceration in three different prisons over the course of one year 
before being transferred to Tule Lake in December of 1943, where he and his family 
reunited.35 Ueno, though in the minority in this respect, vehemently and outwardly 
expressed his anger toward the WRA’s treatment of Japanese Americans. Laughing as he 
later recalled a letter he wrote to his wife while incarcerated at an isolation center in 
Moab, Utah, Ueno paraphrased the sentiment he communicated: "They might kill me, but 
I am glad I die as a Japanese descendent.”36 He articulated this anger, not through an 
expression of cultural or political nationalism, but by defining his identity as specifically 
Japanese. In an era in which assimilation was seen as a gateway to unhyphenated 
Americanism, expressing the desire to be anything other than that resulted in conflict and 
further repeated uprooting throughout the period of incarceration.  
Furthermore, an increasing number of incarcerees—almost exclusively centered 
at Tule Lake—risked the possibility of an even more drastic, international uprooting. 
Driven by fear, access to resources and support, political or nationalist sentiment, or the 
desire to avoid the separation of families, Japanese Americans increasingly requested 
repatriation (in the case of the Issei) or expatriation (in the case of the Nisei). Repatriation 
and expatriation requests numbered almost twenty thousand by 1944, and the 
Denaturalization Act of 1944 made renunciation of American citizenship legally possible 
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for Nisei.37 The loyalty questionnaire and the possibility of the camps closing spurred the 
largest spikes in these kinds of requests. Because the outcomes of the loyalty 
questionnaire were so unclear, many thought they would rather take their chances in 
Japan than face the uncertainty of the questionnaire’s consequences. Similarly, when the 
WRA announced in January of 1945 that the camps would gradually shut down over the 
course of the year, many feared what waited for them on the outside. Incarcerees reported 
hearing discouraging and unfavorable reports from the few Japanese Americans who had 
returned to the West Coast already. These scouts reported damaged or stolen property, 
housing shortages, and employment discrimination.38 Many cited this fear as one of their 
primary reasons for wanting to remain in the camps.39 Some incarcerees reported that 
camp officials posed their options as: leave camp or renounce citizenship. Most of the 
people who initiated this request, then, saw it as a means to avoid or stall another coerced 
migration. Regardless, almost twenty thousand people initiated a process that promised to 
uproot them from the nation entirely. In the end, the vast majority of these requests were 
not fulfilled because most people ultimately decided they wanted to rescind their request. 
Their decision to risk legal and geographic uprooting from the nation stemmed from a 
variety of factors, but were largely made under severe duress and the threat of further 
dislocation.  
The variety of factors that brought people to Tule Lake, along with overcrowding, 
led to increasing internal conflicts within the camp. While ideological differences and a 
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range of backgrounds existed in every camp, segregation brought the most radical 
factions into a shared carceral space with families like the Katos. Voluntary military 
service or—after January 1944—compulsory service served as a major point of 
controversy across all incarceration camps. Although those brought to Tule Lake chose 
not to enter the military, by definition, this did not squash disagreement over Japanese 
American military service and loyalty. Years later when asked what he thought about 
Japanese Americans who enlisted in the military, Akira Kato remarked: “Well, when I 
was in Arizona, it didn't bother me, but when I went [to] Tule Lake, you get this other 
side of the whole war situation. They would rather not see anybody in uniform. At that 
time it really didn't bother me. If a person wanted to serve, it was okay to serve because I 
was willing to serve, too.”40 He posed his affinity toward those Japanese Americans who 
joined the service against what was perhaps a normative assumption in Tule Lake of his 
opposition to it. His response confirms continuing differences of opinion within the 
segregation center and undermines the assumption of homogeneity of Tule Lake’s 
population that followed him long after his time there.  
Conflicting opinions were not confined to differences over military service, and 
the tension led to very tangible changes in living situations that influenced those 
incarcerees’ experiences of uprootedness following segregation. In fall of 1943 a 
farmworkers strike in protest of poor working conditions led to demonstrations and 
violence, culminating in the decision to declare a three-month period of martial law from 
November 1943 to January 1944. Martial law shut down most daily activities, suspended 
many jobs within camp, enforced a curfew, marked a period of food and supply 
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shortages, and implemented an indiscriminate, camp-wide search for signs of punishable 
disloyalty.41 It amplified current tensions within the camp; a pro-Japan nationalist group, 
the Hokoku Seinen Dan, went so far as to demand further segregation of the camp in 
order to separate themselves from those who were not “true disloyals.”42 This period 
stained Tule Lake’s reputation further, and the increased prison-like qualities of the camp 
likely represented a disjuncture from incarcerees’ previous experiences at other camps.  
Incarcerees who transferred to the Tule Lake segregation center were not the only 
group to experience additional uprooting during the period of segregation. Those who 
transferred out of Tule Lake to other camps also likely endured significant changes in 
their community and their experiences of incarceration, demonstrating the variance 
between different incarceration camps. Placement in different camps largely depended on 
region; the military issued Civilian Exclusion Orders which specified a nearby “assembly 
center” where a specific population was required to report. From there, the military 
organized “evacuations” of all incarcerees in a given assembly center to an incarceration 
camp. Therefore, many incarcerees joined others who had worked in similar occupations 
from the same general region or—in some cases—the very same communities they came 
from. Transfers, however, held the potential to bring Japanese Americans from different 
class and cultural backgrounds into contact with each other.  
One such instance occurred when a group of incarcerees from Tule Lake arrived 
at the Topaz incarceration camp in Utah and found themselves “virtually forced” to work 
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on the water pipeline replacement crew.43 Utah’s environment and its soil conditions 
made pipeline replacement a regular—albeit despised—job among Topaz’s incarcerees. 
The dirty and unappealing nature of the job, as well as Topaz incarcerees’ attitude toward 
this particular work, imbued the job with unfavorable social meaning. When Topaz 
workers delegated this job to new arrivals from Tule Lake, they forced them to take on 
the job with the lowest status. Connie Chiang describes the way that the social meaning 
associated with this type of harsh labor only worsened other feelings of displacement 
associated with leaving Tule Lake, where they were incarcerated with other prewar 
farmers: “Taking this job compounded their feelings of inferiority, as most Topaz 
residents were urbanites from the San Francisco Bay Area and appeared to be “more 
cultured and sophisticated than they.””44 Their transfer to an unfamiliar camp with 
unknown incarcerees from largely different backgrounds added to the gravity of their 
experience of displacement.  
Seasonal agricultural leave opened up work for incarcerees outside the boundaries 
of camp, but required consistent movement and separation from friends and family still in 
camp. The program simultaneously demonstrated the permeability of camp boundaries 
and the inescapable nature of the uprootedness and hardship that followed Japanese 
Americans regardless of their status within or outside barbed wire. Authorized seasonal 
agricultural work assignments began as early as 1942 in response to growing concern 
from farmers who reported labor shortages compounded both by the war and 
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incarceration.45 Eight thousand Japanese Americans were sent to the Midwest to harvest 
eighty thousand acres of farmland in 1942.46 Some incarcerees stayed in camp while their 
spouses or family members worked as day laborers outside of camp for extended periods 
of time. One Japanese American woman’s husband worked throughout their time at the 
Poston camp while she cared for their children, traveling to Iowa, Idaho, and Nebraska to 
help support their growing family.47 Even labor in the camps, then, often required 
frequent movement or separation.  
Camps were not static places. From the very beginning, incarcerees moved back 
and forth across camp boundaries for work or as a result of acts of resistance or perceived 
disloyalty. These movements often separated them from their families and the 
communities they formed within camps. Despite the harsh environmental conditions, 
living arrangements, and other restrictions of life in incarceration camps, people managed 
to find stability and community there—two things that incarcerees often struggled to find 
upon leaving the camps. Patterns of migration, however, continued throughout the period 
of incarceration and continually tore incarcerees away from any version of home they 
managed to find or create.  
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Hostels, Temporary Lodging, and Frequent Migration: Rejoining the Workforce and 
Finding Housing Post-Incarceration 
Prior to incarceration, agriculture comprised a major area in which Japanese 
Americans found employment on the West Coast. However, California’s Alien Land Law 
of 1913 closed off land ownership and long-term leases to aliens ineligible for 
citizenship. The Supreme Court case Ozawa v. U.S. (1922) rendered virtually all first-
generation Japanese immigrants ineligible for citizenship. Many Japanese American 
families found their way around this barrier by putting their land in their Nisei children’s 
names—who held birthright citizenship—or in that of another party. Oftentimes, 
Japanese American families ended up leasing the land that they farmed. Of the Japanese 
American farmers in Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington, only 19.5 percent 
were full owners and 6.1 percent were part owners, compared with 70 percent who leased 
their land.48  
The barriers to land ownership plagued those Japanese Americans engaged in 
agricultural work before and after the war, leading to patterns of uprooting both before 
and after the war. Some Japanese Americans managed to preserve their homes and future 
livelihoods by hiring managers or finding trusted friends to look after their land. Eiichi 
Sakauye’s Issei father had bought farmland in San Jose, California, in 1907—six years 
prior to legislation prohibiting the sale.49 His family left the farm and their home in the 
care of a neighboring family they had a close relationship with. In December of 1944, 
right before the military lifted the ban on Japanese American presence in the western 
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defense zone, Sakauye returned to the farm on a special permit to find everything much 
the same; even his family dog remembered him.50 Similarly, those Japanese American 
families in the three agricultural colonies of Livingston, Cressey, and Cortez who became 
farm owners by putting their land in the name of the American Land and Produce 
Company—a Japanese American owned company—hired managers for their land and 
returned to their old homes and community after the war. This is not to diminish the 
hardships these individuals experienced upon returning to their land. However, the 
continued existence of a physical home and place to return to distinguished their 
experience from those agricultural workers who found themselves drifting from place to 
place, going wherever they found work and staying in communal housing units.  
 The Katos were one such family. Because they leased the land they farmed in El 
Monte prior to the war, they had no permanent residence to return to after the war and 
struggled to establish a home. Initially, when they left Tule Lake in November of 1945, 
they returned to El Monte only to find their old house gone—literally and figuratively. It 
had been razed and replaced with subdivisions. Additionally, they found themselves 
ostracized from their old community. Although they stayed for a while with a white 
family with whom they were old friends, they could not find employment or housing. 
Soon, they moved on to Orosi in central California, where they lived and worked on a 
ranch owned by a Japanese family, the Katayamas, while they waited out the surge of 
anti-Japanese sentiment in California after the war. Although they themselves did not 
experience violence, Akira Kato recounts instances of hostility: “windows were broken, 
rocks were thrown at cars and things like that. But that eventually went away…after that, 
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we moved out of the Katayama farm, and found housing.”51 Domestic terrorism against 
returning Japanese Americans included around twenty shooting incidents, as well as 
instances of vandalism, arson, and threats with no reported deaths. Although moderate in 
numbers, these were not isolated incidents and contributed to an environment of 
trepidation and fear that made many Japanese Americans reluctant to return to the West 
Coast. Japanese Americans did not necessarily resettle in the place of their choosing. 
Their resettlement in largely temporary situations was tainted by fear of unwelcoming 
communities, the continuing threat of family separation, and the discomfort of the 
crowded conditions of boarding in other families’ homes. The unfriendly climate 
contributed to the housing and employment discrimination Kato’s family faced—as well 
as influencing the fear and trepidation they likely felt in facing unpredictable attitudes in 
their community.  
 The pattern of temporary housing and frequent migration repeats itself through 
many peoples’ stories of resettlement. These migrations took many shapes, involved a 
wide range of collaborators, and altered at least the physical placement—if not 
ideological understanding—of home. Admittedly, this pattern of repeated uprooting was 
not unusual for many families employed in agriculture before the war. However, if the 
same discriminatory factors guided the alien land laws in the pre-war period and during 
incarceration, these patterns of migration following the war can be understood as an 
outgrowth of both of these discriminatory periods. The period of incarceration did not 
simply interrupt these families’ lives; it reinforced and complicated the terms of their 
migration, putting up further barriers for finding permanent homes. Alien land laws 
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remained but, while legal barriers reflected and continued to shape opinions of Japanese 
Americans, these likely imposed fewer and fewer direct impacts as more Nisei came of 
age during incarceration and were eligible to hold land titles for, or in concert, with their 
noncitizen parents. 52 The loss of revenue and property that accompanied incarceration, 
however, made property purchases unattainable for several years after the camps closed. 
Families often continued the practice of sharecropping or, in some cases, migratory 
farmwork to make ends meet. The Yasui family returned from the Gila River 
incarceration camp only to face five subsequent moves as they searched for permanent 
housing and jobs. One of the daughters, Masayo Arii, describes the way her father 
coordinated their movements among others in a similar situation: “Every time he moved, 
I guess some of these friends went along with him. So until he went to Sanger, 
[California], he had a lot of people with him, and they lived in [a] big—they would find 
these old houses with many, many rooms, and they would all live there and work out. My 
dad would take these people in his pickup to different ranches to work.”53 Her father, 
mother, and youngest sister all moved around with this larger group—a break from their 
prolonged residence while renting orchards in Winters, California, prior to the war. The 
economic and physical loss incurred during incarceration certainly deterred 
socioeconomic mobility following the war.  
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 In many cases—as was the case, too, with whole families—hostels offered a 
temporary solution to housing. Churches and civic groups often ran these establishments, 
converting old Buddhist churches or large community buildings into temporary shared 
living spaces specifically for returning Japanese Americans. Ironically, with tight living 
quarters and shared community spaces, they resembled incarceration camp conditions.54 
Although the Public Health Department deemed many of these facilities unsuitable living 
spaces, many Japanese Americans were sent to these shelters or others like them in 
WRA’s rush to close down the camps.55 Still, these hostels allowed individuals a 
temporary place to stay as they searched for permanent housing. Nineteen-year-old 
Masayo Arii and her father both left Gila River as scouts, traveling up and down 
California looking for work. Unable to find a job to support their entire family, Arii’s 
father told her to stay in Los Angeles—which had a number of hostels—to find a job. She 
stayed at a hostel until being hired on as a domestic servant and watched with guilt as her 
parents and younger sister spent the next couple years moving from one place to the 
next.56 Two years passed before they found a stable living situation in Fresno, and several 
more years went by before Arii’s growing family and her parents pooled their money to 
buy their own land in Santa Clara County. Their experience reflects the extent to which 
families leaned on hostels and other communal living arrangements to sustain their return 
to the West Coast. As it often proved difficult to stay together, hostels provided a 
necessary establishment for them to manage that separation.  
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In other cases, hostels facilitated family unity and stability in a time of upheaval. 
Despite their inherently temporary nature, some Japanese American families forged 
connections to these places and prolonged their stays indefinitely. Aiko Kitaji grew up in 
San Jose in a farming community. Unlike many of her classmates, her family enjoyed a 
privileged position in the community, because her father held a management position in a 
large agricultural company. Although her parents immigrated without promise of success, 
“everything they did seemed to work in their favor.”57 Regardless, they lost their land and 
most of their belongings when they were sent to Poston, Arizona, leading her parents to 
encourage Kitaji to marry a man she met in camp “for [her] own safety.”58 They feared 
for their daughter’s ability to make a living for herself outside of the camp. In order to 
return to a familiar region and be close to family, Kitaji, her husband, and their two 
children decided to stay at the Gilroy Hot Springs—a converted resort situated thirty 
miles from her hometown of San Jose. The owner, Kyuzaburo Sakata, converted the 
resort to a hostel and asked Kitaji’s husband and brother-in-law to help him manage the 
property upon their return to the West Coast. Sakata opened the living quarters of the 
resort up to Japanese American families returning to the West Coast for a number of 
years before slowly transforming it back to a regularly functioning hotel. Kitaji estimates 
that around fifty people stayed there initially, although they eventually drifted away over 
the years as they found other living situations and employment.  
The design and layouts of hostels mirrored the communal living style incarcerees 
experienced in the camps. Because the Gilroy Hot Springs was built as a resort, it was not 
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easily equipped for independent living. Residents initially shared facilities and cooked 
communally: “just like a mess hall again.”59 Valerie Matsumoto comments on the ways 
that the gendered division of labor made these shared living arrangements placed 
responsibility on the ability of Issei and Nisei women to coordinate their efforts, while 
simultaneously making them relive the lack of privacy they endured during 
incarceration.60 Kitaji’s story reflects this burden, and she remembers consistent tension 
between her, her mother-in-law, and other women staying in the hostel. “They all keep 
looking at [me] to see how I’m managing to take care of my family,” she thought at the 
time.61 Despite these discomforts and their lack of reliable transportation to the outside 
world, the hostel provided Kitaji and her relatives a place to build their family, earn a 
better income from understanding employers, and feel like a part of a community. For 
instance, Kitaji remembers taking elderly residents to their doctors appointments to 
translate for them, and by the time they left, they had built a two-room addition to their 
living quarters. The hostel became home to the Kitaji family for ten years after they 
returned from camp; they might have stayed even longer, but they needed to educate their 
seven children. With no school nearby, they decided to finally move to Watsonville.  
Hostels represent one of the crucial responses to the crisis of resettlement. Their 
very design denied permanence and prolonged the pattern of uprooting for many, but they 
formed a bridge to more stable homes. They provided a solution, albeit a temporary one, 
to the problem of returning to find homes occupied or destroyed. Their very structure and 
the inhabitants’ understanding of the nature of their living situation denied returning 
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Japanese Americans the comfort of knowing another move was not imminent. It also 
made it perfectly clear that their exclusion was not an easily reversible action; hostels 
comprised one of the waiting rooms in which they lingered as they searched for ways to 
find their way back to pre-war homes and occupations—or the closest things to them. 
 While Japanese Americans faced significant trouble finding housing immediately 
upon leaving the camps in 1945, they were not without allies or resources. In preparation 
for the imminent closure of the camps, the WRA distributed a modest sum to families as 
they left incarceration, provided transportation, and shipped their belongings.62 Groups 
like the JACL and local Japanese American resettlement organizations established 
networks for aiding the transition out of camps. They were not without help from white 
communities and allies, as well. Some, like the Kato family, stayed with friends 
following the war. Others, like the Sakauye family, left their property and homes in the 
hands of loyal neighbors and friends. White allies also advocated for Japanese Americans 
in the job and housing markets. Gerda Isenberg, the chairman of the Palo Alto Committee 
on Fair Play and American Principles, corresponded diligently with incarcerees toward 
the end of the war. She acted as a liaison between women looking for domestic workers 
for their household and Japanese American men and women looking for employment and 
housing in California.  
 Isenberg’s correspondence provides insight into resettlement that, although 
narrow in scope, illuminates larger themes associated with employment and housing after 
the war. For Nisei women hoping to return to urban areas, domestic work offered the best 
prospects for employment. Other, less sought-after positions, included work as a 
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beautician or as a factory operative.63 For women attempting to return to affluent, 
predominantly white towns like Palo Alto, housing proved a more difficult barrier to 
resettlement and favored single women without children. Edith Emerson wrote Isenberg 
in June of 1945, six months after the military lifted the West Coast ban on Japanese 
Americans, asking for a “returning Japanese” man to work half a day per week in her 
garden and “someone for house work” for two half days per week. A couple months 
earlier, Alice T. Ford wrote Isenberg to inquire about potential “Japanese servants.” She 
asked for advice on the appropriate amount to pay one such servant, given room and 
board, and how she could hire a maid from one of the incarceration camps.64 These two 
letters demonstrate the range of available situations offered in Palo Alto at this time. 
Emerson’s letter indicates the need for workers who might make a living from multiple 
part-time domestic positions in the area. Additionally, it assumes that those individuals 
would have lodging elsewhere. As Isenberg made clear in several of her letters to 
Japanese American individuals writing to her, “housing is the biggest problem here; 
finding work is no difficulty.”65 Some, like Alice Ford, had the means to offer room and 
board to full-time employees yet these positions also came with limitations since most of 
these boarding positions accommodated only single people or married couples. For 
example, Isenberg replied to one Mrs. M. Motoki’s inquiry for domestic positions and 
housing for her and her husband, implying that the family would be able to accommodate 
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the separate living quarters Motoki specified in her letter.66 Housing, then, was attainable, 
but in Palo Alto it was often contingent upon single or married inhabitants 
 However, larger families hoping to find domestic jobs in urban areas appeared to 
have had more difficult finding housing. Harry Yasumura’s experience echoes this 
theme, as he endeavored to find homes for his parents and brother in San Francisco. He 
wrote Isenberg in November 1945 to follow up on previous correspondence concerning 
finding positions in Palo Alto, which Isenberg ultimately was unable to provide 
assistance with. Only a day prior, he found employment and board for his mother in a 
house and reported his efforts to find similar positions for his brother and father nearby. 
“Although this plan is not a satisfactory one, after several family discussions, we have 
agreed that entering a home separately would [be] a stepping stone to a normal life.”67 
Despite struggles to stay together through the trials of incarceration, resettlement posed a 
new challenge to families and often resulted in separation, or occluded the possibility of 
their desired home.  
Gender also influenced the particular barriers that incarcerees faced in finding 
employment and housing. Eleanor Kubo wrote Isenberg in May of 1945 from Heart 
Mountain, hoping that Palo Alto held the opportunity for her to work and for her three 
children to attend school. She inquired after a domestic position for herself and housing 
for herself and her children. Although her husband was still in U.S. custody, the WRA 
had begun to pressure incarcerees to leave camp following their announcement in January 
                                               
66 Gerda Isenberg to Mrs. M. Motoki, 1945, folder 1, box 2, Gerda Isenberg Papers, BANC.  
67 Harry Yasumura to Gerda Isenberg, 10 November 1945, folder 22, box 2, Gerda Isenberg Papers, BANC.  
  96 
of 1945.68 Isenberg regretfully informed Kubo that there were no houses available to rent 
in the area and that it was very difficult to find an available boarding situation for so 
many people. She suggested that Kubo inquire about housing in nearby San Jose—
although other letters written to Isenberg indicate that San Jose had gained a reputation as 
a hostile place for Japanese Americans. Incarceration facilitated and often necessitated 
the increasing presence of Nisei women in the workforce—a trend that continued after 
they left the camps. Discrimination meant that Nisei men often found work as manual 
laborers or were forced to move to find jobs for their specific skill set; by comparison, 
Nisei women generally found increasing employment prospects in the decade following 
the war and “for many families, the rise in female economic participation proved vital to 
entering the ranks of the middle class.”69 Incarceration influenced a shift in gender roles, 
as Nisei women left camps to go to universities or work and took on economic 
responsibilities that had traditionally belonged to Issei men.70 Additionally, as in the case 
of Eleanor Kubo, incarceration or military service left some women alone to figure things 
out for themselves and their children during the period of resettlement—ultimately 
influencing the kinds of positions and housing they found available to them.  
The vast number of Japanese Americans who returned to the West Coast indicates 
the pull to return home. For many, home consisted not of a house or land, but of a 
familiar region, recognizable community, and milder climate. Sato, a farmer originally 
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from Stockton, said in regards to his decision to return west, “Regardless of the obstacles 
one likes to return to familiar places.”71 One man hoping to resettle from Chicago 
lamented, “I am used to [working] under the sun, as [a] gardener, [and] both of us should 
like to go back [to] very nice state of California, as the climate [is] very nice and also 
California folks [are] interested] and [have] much understanding of our people.”72 He was 
not the only one to cite California’s climate and environment as reasons to return to the 
West Coast; those who worked in agriculture and as fisherman prior to the war, 
especially, had a very real incentive to return to a familiar landscape. Others may have 
wanted to get away from the unforgiving climates that characterized incarceration camps. 
Aiko Kitaji’s husband took field labor jobs all over the Midwest while she remained in 
camp and, in response to her suggestion to move east or stay in Arizona, he responded 
firmly in the negative. Kitaji remembers him telling her, “I hate this hot weather, 
especially with whirlwinds. Dust storms. Nothing but sand.”73 They were a few of the 
seventy-five thousand people who left the camps after January 1, 1945—two-thirds of 
this group returned to the West Coast.74  
Many Japanese Americans felt that their future lay on the West Coast. Akira 
Kato, the sixteen-year-old boy who boarded a train to the unknown in August 1942, 
returned to California following incarceration and his later service in the Korean War. 
California was his home. His struggle to find employment and housing, and his 
subsequent movements all across the Central Valley never shook his resolve to settle 
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down there. And that’s exactly what he did. He moved to Santa Clara County for good in 
1958, became a gardener, and lived out the rest of his years there. Despite Kato’s success 
in finding a stable home and employment on the West Coast, his story included several 
moments at which patterns of compelled migrations demonstrated his tenuous position. 
Frequent movement, uprooting, and uncertainty characterized his experience of 
incarceration and the opportunities—or lack thereof—he encountered following his 
release. 
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CHAPTER IV 
NEITHER HERE NOR THERE: JAPANESE AMERICAN RENUNCIANTS AND 
THE TRANSNATIONAL STORY OF THEIR RESETTLEMENT  
The Nishibaru neighborhood in the Mii district of Fukuoka, Japan, lies on the 
northern bank of a small river that meanders through two small, rural towns before 
leading out to the East China Sea. The neighborhood is sparsely populated today. Small 
plots of farmland separate houses and low cedar-block fences intermittently line 
neighborhood roads.1 Nagasaki lies ninety miles south—close enough that the residents 
likely saw the cloud of ash rise over the city after the infamous atomic bombing on 
August 9, 1945. Less than two years after that mushroom cloud rose in the distance, a 
man named Masayuki Akiyoshi wrote a letter from his new home address in the 
Nishibaru neighborhood to a San Franciscan lawyer named Wayne Collins. Written in 
May 1947, the letter was likely only one of many Akiyoshi wrote in his first year living 
in Japan as a stateless person. His parents, brother, friends, and most everyone he had 
come to know over the course of his life still resided in the United States following the 
war.2  
Born in Los Angeles, California, in 1917 to two Japanese citizens, Akiyoshi 
received dual citizenship upon his birth. He went on to renounce his Japanese citizenship 
in 1937 and served in the U.S. military for a year before the Army honorably discharged 
him and other Japanese Americans in the armed forces following the attack on Pearl 
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Harbor. While incarcerated during World War II, Akiyoshi elected to renounce his U.S. 
birthright citizenship—a process the U.S. Defense Department designed for the radical 
factions of incarcerated Japanese Americans. The Hokoku Seinen Dan (Young Men’s 
Association to Serve the Nation), a pro-Japan nationalist and cultural group in Tule Lake, 
was the most visible of these factions. Akiyoshi counted himself a member of this group 
and, following his renunciation and request for repatriation, he left the United States for 
Japan in 1946. It was not his first time living in Japan. As with many other Nisei 
Japanese Americans, his parents had sent him to Japan from the ages of six to nine to 
attend school and live with his extended family. He still felt the sinews of these 
connections twenty years later when, enraged by the U.S. government’s treatment of him 
and other Japanese Americans and demonized for his involvement in the Hokoku Seinen 
Dan, he made his decision to return. He arrived in Japan to an ailing grandmother, an 
aunt, an uncle, post-war chaos and scarcity, and an occupying force led by the United 
States. The letter he wrote to Collins in May 1957 announced his desire to join the 
lawsuit of five thousand other renunciants in both the U.S. and Japan, which argued that 
their decision had been made under duress and under unlawful conditions.3  
 The renunciation program and its subsequent fallout is essential for understanding 
the extent to which various bureaucratic agencies attempted to uproot Japanese 
Americans from legal and social belonging in the United States. By initiating the 
renunciation program during the period of incarceration, the Department of Defense 
strove to substantiate legal means by which to nullify citizenship and carry out 
deportation on the basis of national origin. The renunciation program essentially provided 
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justification for the logic behind the Tule Lake segregation center and, more broadly, 
incarceration. It ostensibly demonstrated that Japanese Americans posed a threat to some 
people’s vision of America and shifted the responsibility for uprooting from the nation to 
the renunciants themselves. The prolonged struggle to regain citizenship extended far 
beyond the end of the war, illustrating one of the tangible ways in which incarceration 
during the war connected to larger patterns of legal discrimination and exclusion. 
Renunciants’ liminal position on the boundary of citizenship created uncertainty as to 
what their inclusion in a national sense of home looked like. Stateless Nisei in the United 
States and Japan during the 1940s and 1950s felt the tangible impact of their legal status 
in this instability. More importantly, the threat of deportation forced many renunciants to 
reframe the ways they presented their own transcultural understanding of home in the 
United States; they reframed their identities as solely and purely “American” in order to 
bargain for their claim to belonging. These articulations of self, of culture, of belonging 
did not always sway legal decisions, and the renunciation program created a long, drawn 
out period of displacement—legally and/or geographically—that played out across 
national borders, personal relationships, and bureaucrats’ desks. The uprooting of 
renunciants from the sense of home accessible to fellow Americans led them to adopt 
new understandings of the barriers to belonging that they faced as Japanese Americans in 
the United States.  
 Wayne Collins, the lawyer who handled the renunciant cases, was an experienced 
and reportedly “fiery” lawyer with a reputation for taking unpopular or particularly 
difficult cases that other lawyers avoided and had worked closely with ACLU lawyers in 
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the past.4 He worked tirelessly to end Japanese American incarceration, arguing Fred 
Korematsu and Mitsuye Endo’s cases in front of the Supreme Court in 1944, and 
continued to represent Japanese Americans in court until his death in 1974. Tall, with a 
shock of white hair, foreboding brow, and a penchant for pinstriped suits, he cut an 
intimidating figure. His work on these cases never brought him exceptional financial gain 
or unequivocal respect—indeed, some Nisei have reflected on him as a “hero” while 
others have called him a “fanatic” or a “lunatic.”5 These cases consumed his entire life; 
he burned professional and personal bridges in his uncompromising quest.6 In 1972, a 
Nisei activist organizing a museum exhibit for the California Historical Society suggested 
Collins as a candidate for writing the exhibit’s conclusion with a caveat that summed up 
the lawyer’s character: “He will write you a conclusion that printers will not print. If you 
haven’t met Mr. Collins, you haven’t experienced the bitterness of 110,000 evacuees in 
one fighting Irishman.”7 In the twenty-three years that Collins handled the renunciant 
cases, thousands of documents came into his possession; still, these likely constitute only 
a fraction of the documents that would reveal the renunciants’ entire story.  
Renunciants’ stories cross national borders and archives, as well as language. It is 
difficult to track the movements and experiences of Japanese Americans in the United 
States after World War II and even more difficult to track those repatriated or expatriated 
to Japan. Those silences, present in the very files of the lawyer determining their 
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citizenship status, suggest the unsuccessful conclusion to their cases. In the documents 
Collins accumulated, U.S. bureaucrats, lawyers, renunciants, and their families made 
their respective cases, revealing the ways in which they chose to represent their histories 
and past decisions to make their arguments. This particular window into their attempts to 
regain legal status and physical permanence in the U.S. highlights the stakes under which 
they wrote and their feelings of urgency.  
 Renunciants were a proportionately small group of the total number of Japanese 
Americans incarcerated during the war but, significantly, represented the final iteration of 
a group whittled down by policies imposed by various bureaucratic efforts. In the days 
and weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Department of Justice arrested 2,192 
Japanese aliens, 1,393 German nationals, and 264 Italian nationals.8 One important 
distinction between these groups, besides the numbers targeted and surveilled by the 
Justice Department, was their race and access to citizenship. The 1924 Immigration Act 
solidified earlier legislation that barred Japanese immigrants from citizenship entirely, 
meaning that virtually no first-generation Japanese Americans held citizenship at the 
outbreak of World War II regardless of time spent in the United States or their social and 
economic roots.9 The Justice Department arrested Issei Japanese American religious, 
economic, and cultural leaders. They interned these especially “suspicious” individuals in 
detention facilities and held individual loyalty hearings. The government subsequently 
kept some of the detainees in these facilities and “paroled” others to incarceration centers.  
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 Many of these people eventually ended up at the Tule Lake segregation center, 
especially following the administration of the disastrous loyalty questionnaire in the 
spring of 1943. Those who gave unsatisfactory answers to questions concerning loyalty 
and their willingness to aid the war effort gave their answers for a variety of reasons, 
including those stimulated by fear, anger, and confusion. Many of these individuals, 
responding to a questionnaire officially titled “Application for Leave Clearance,” 
believed their answers determined whether they would face a sudden relocation to the 
unknown and reportedly hostile Midwest or East Coast.10 Many of those who answered 
“no-no” on these “applications” hoped to avoid confronting a country that found them 
suspect. This motivation may have influenced later decisions to renounce citizenship 
because, ultimately, renunciants likely feared that they would always be treated with 
suspicion and fear in the United States.  
In addition to those whose answers the review board deemed disloyal, three 
thousand incarcerees requested repatriation or expatriation during the registration 
period.11 By 1944, the number of people requesting repatriation or expatriation reached 
twenty thousand.12 The loyalty questionnaire placed additional pressure on the excluded 
and incarcerated populations that saw potential for their future in Japan. Family ties, 
cultural or political affinity, and the potential for legal claims to citizenship in Japan 
likely made this option more practical. After all, the U.S. government made it very clear 
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that it was all too willing to test the validity and protections of Japanese American 
citizenship. Additionally, incarceration and the questionnaire signaled to Issei Japanese 
that the U.S. was unlikely to grant them citizenship anytime soon. The war held the 
potential to intensify the consequences of their status as “aliens ineligible for 
citizenship.”13  These requests, however, signaled to the WRA that a more radical faction 
of the group of “disloyals” existed. The roughly eighteen thousand individuals eventually 
incarcerated in the Tule Lake segregation center represent a group that the War 
Relocation Authority singled out as disloyal. The identification of these people as “real” 
threats maintained the illusion that incarceration actively protected the home front. 
Maligned and labeled as credible threats, 85 percent of incarcerees over the age of 
seventeen at Tule Lake applied to renounce their citizenship.14 
On July 1, President Roosevelt signed the Denaturalization Act of 1944 into law 
as a final attempt to justify Japanese American incarceration. Although the courts upheld 
the validity of the government’s treatment of Japanese Americans in test cases during 
1943, a series of test cases that promised to compromise the constitutionality was moving 
toward the Supreme Court during 1944.15 Concerned by this threat and the prospect of 
releasing the incarcerees of Tule Lake, Attorney General Francis Biddle proposed an 
amendment to the Nationality Act of 1940 to allow Japanese American citizens to 
renounce their own citizenship. Previously, only those American citizens residing abroad 
for long periods during times of war could renounce that citizenship. This new legislation 
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established an application process for renunciation, requiring specific approval by the 
U.S. Attorney General. Previous legislation limited allowances for denaturalization 
because of the potential threat during wartime posed by those attempting to avoid the 
draft or legal action in cases of treason. This new law made it possible to create stateless 
people who could be subject to continued incarceration and, eventually, deportation to 
Japan.  
Additionally, the new law justified the government’s policy of exclusion, 
incarceration, and segregation. By demonstrating that it had singled out a group of the 
most disloyal and dangerous incarcerees of Tule Lake, the government hoped to 
demonstrate the necessity and effectiveness of both mass incarceration and the loyalty 
questionnaire. In a heated letter to the Director of the ACLU, Edward J. Ennis—the 
director of the Alien Enemy Control Unit of the Department of Justice—praised the 
renunciation program for the “important public benefits” it imparted and painted it as a 
“victory for civil liberties.”16 He insisted that there was no scenario in which he could 
have safely released the members of the Hokoku Seinen Dan and that the renunciation 
program is what had finally convinced the military to lift the exclusion ban and allow the 
camps to close, thereby ensuring the freedom of innocent incarcerees. Unable to charge 
members of the Hokoku Seinen Dan with any crime, the Department of Defense came up 
with a solution that framed continued incarceration and eventual removal as their own 
choice. And, as all choices are created from circumstances transmitted from the past, it 
was a choice.17 Some renunciants chose to rid themselves of citizenship they came to see 
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as meaningless. However, camp administrators did not clarify the consequences of their 
choice, and the context of prolonged incarceration and racial discrimination narrowed 
alternative choices available to them. Still, some renunciants were likely aware of the 
potentially negative repercussions, but chose to take a calculated risk anyway. 
Renunciants chose to apply for renunciation, but from a coerced and vulnerable position 
in which they had few good options available to them. 
Although it did not specifically name any particular group, the law applied solely 
to Japanese American Nisei. Between 1944 and 1946, 5,589 Nisei renounced their 
citizenship.18 All but 128 of these resided in the Tule Lake segregation camp.19 Although 
Attorney General Biddle proposed the law with the militant pro-Japan nationalist group 
Hokoku Seinen Dan in mind, the number of people requesting renunciation far surpassed 
its membership numbers. Only a small minority renounced out of anger or political 
beliefs. Historian Mae Ngai argues that these decisions commonly emerged from 
practical, instrumental considerations.20 Many people later insisted that they were 
pressured by the pervasive and sometimes violent influence of the Hokoku Seinen Dan. 
Although this group very well could have been one of the main influences, the timeline of 
renunciation suggests that some people may have scapegoated the maligned organization 
to support their own cases and that other factors likely took precedent in influencing the 
decision. Hokoku Seinen Dan began encouraging renunciations by their fellow 
incarcerees in October 1944—when the WRA introduced the renunciation to the 
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camps—but the vast majority of renunciation requests poured in after mid-December 
1944.21 This coincides with the Ex Parte Endo Supreme Court decision, in which they 
declared the continuing incarceration of loyal Japanese Americans unconstitutional. 
Subsequently, the military ended mass exclusion from the West Coast, and the WRA 
announced they would close all camps within the next year. Many people expressed 
intense fear of resettlement within the general population of America. Camps represented 
a horrible injustice, but also acted as a buffer between Japanese Americans and the nation 
that chose to exclude them. Furthermore, the military created a list of incarcerees that 
would continue to be barred from resettling on the West Coast. Those on this list faced an 
unknown resettlement without the comfort of returning to their home state and 
communities.22 During individual exclusion hearings for those who appeared on this list, 
camp administrators posed only two choices: leave camp or renounce citizenship.23 Many 
Nisei chose to renounce their citizenship to put off resettlement, assuming that 
surrendering legal status would not preclude remaining in the United States. After all, 
statelessness had not impeded their Issei parents from building their lives in the United 
States. 
Renunciation likely made practical sense for many families who had real 
economic or familial ties in Japan and anticipated a better, more secure life there. 
Renunciation gave Nisei the same legal status as their Issei parents. Families often 
renounced together, replicating patterns of loyalty questionnaire answers intended to keep 
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families together. Many young Nisei later reported that their own Issei parents forced 
them to renounce their citizenship.24 Because their Issei parents did not have citizenship 
at stake in these appeals, renunciants may have attributed their decision to their parents’ 
influence to prove “coercion” rather than other, perhaps less acceptable reasons for 
renouncing. This is not to say that parental pressure may not have played a significant 
role—indeed, Issei often still had family or community ties in Japan and some even 
owned property there—but to acknowledge the ways renunciants may have framed these 
narratives in their legal appeals. Although many Nisei grew up entirely in the United 
States, many of them had attended Japanese school and had the language skills to 
communicate effectively in Japan. Some had even lived in Japan during their adolescence 
and received schooling there. This group—the Kibei—was overly represented at Tule 
Lake because extensive time spent in Japan was a marker of potential disloyalty that had 
factored into the loyalty categorization and subsequent transfer to the Tule Lake 
segregation center.25 Their background in Japan influenced the popularity of renunciation 
among Kibei. Cultural, political, and familial ties established through experience created 
the contexts in which many Kibei made this decision in order to pursue the possibility of 
a future in Japan—a possibility that was less attainable for Nisei without these particular 
ties. 
Japanese nationalists at Tule Lake simultaneously rejected ties to the nation that 
rejected them and established connections to a new nation. Pressures to declare loyalty to 
the United States called into question the legitimacy of their presence and their past in the 
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U.S. Most Japanese Americans vehemently confirmed their ties to the U.S. By declaring 
themselves “truly American” they shaped their origin narrative into one of assimilation 
and stirring nationalism. However, the challenge that incarceration posed to Japanese 
Americans’ claim to belonging in the U.S. also prompted expressions of Japanese 
nationalism. Contrary to these confirmations of assimilation and loyalty, members of the 
Hokoku Seinen Dan took Japanese language classes, assembled for daily morning drills, 
and strongly encouraged expatriation or repatriation to Japan.26 Rather than deny 
accusations of their inherent difference, the Hokoku Seinen Dan leaned into the fissures 
those accusations created and strove to create new means of belonging through 
organizing and imagining a place for themselves in Japan. Historian Susan Matt argues 
that a sense of homesickness amongst immigrant communities can be tied to the creation 
of specific origin narratives that evoke foreign nationalism. 27 The Hokoku Seinen Dan 
encouraged a shared sense of pride predicated on national origin. The group fostered the 
idea of a common link to Japan and a narrative that allowed them a legitimate, 
meaningful claim to belonging to a nation. They found only doubt and exclusion in the 
United States and chose to seek acceptance elsewhere.  
Repatriation or expatriation and renunciation, while indelibly linked during this 
period, represented differing means of removal. Those who requested repatriation or 
expatriation indicated a desire to leave the United States altogether. Those who applied to 
renounce citizenship surrendered their legal status in the United States, but did not 
necessarily indicate the desire to depart. In the context of geographic and metaphorical 
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exclusion, these decisions represent distinct choices that incarcerees made to control their 
movement and status as much as they could. Not everyone who applied for expatriation 
applied for renunciation, and vice versa. Additionally, these application forms were 
introduced during different periods of incarceration; incarcerees applied for repatriation 
as early as 1943 in response to the loyalty questionnaire, but the renunciation application 
was not introduced until late in 1944. Incarcerees sent renunciation applications to the 
Justice Department until the end of February 1945, and the attorney general approved 
5,049 of those requests.28 The Justice Department attempted to tie legal and physical 
exclusion together when, in October 1945, the Department of Justice released a notice 
announcing that all renunciants at Tule Lake needed to immediately apply for 
repatriation. This notice explicitly conflated renunciation and removal, stating that those 
who had renounced their citizenship had, in doing so, “indicated [their] desire to be 
repatriated to Japan.”29 It requested that they complete an application for repatriation in 
order to prepare for a systematic registration process with the department. The 
Denaturalization Act had opened the door to merge two programs together to uproot 
Japanese Americans from their legal claims to protections and belonging, as well as their 
physical presence in the United States.  
Like incarceration itself, however, this process stood on unstable legal ground. As 
the Department of Justice geared up for a massive slate of removals in November 1945, it 
experienced pushback from renunciants that stalled government officials in their tracks. 
In the latter half of 1945, what had once been an abstract idea changed, and they now 
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faced the very real threat of removal. Suddenly, the impact of their distant decision to 
renounce their citizenship meant removal to Japan—a country in which some renunciants 
had never set foot. Renunciation initially seemed to offer a reprieve from displacement to 
an unknown place and community. Now, it promised even more distant and unfamiliar 
displacement under seemingly irreversible circumstances. Most Japanese Americans 
grew up watching the older generation maneuver the United States without citizenship. 
Issei could not own land or vote in elections, but their lack of citizenship did not prevent 
them from making the United States their home. During the late summer and fall of 1945, 
the fate of renunciants who decided they wanted their U.S. citizenship back hung in the 
balance. Neither these renunciants nor the various U.S. bureaucratic agencies involved 
with renunciation knew the future outcome of these cases with certainty. During these 
months, federal agencies faced off with renunciants and with each other. The atomic 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 and Japan’s surrender in 
September increased the stakes of the debate and changed renunciants’ ideas of the 
potential home that awaited them if they were deported. This geopolitical context and the 
conflict among U.S. departments themselves intensified the precariousness of 
renunciants’ situations and feelings of uprootedness. Those who fought for their 
citizenship did so with the knowledge that their government was ready to strip them of 
their status as Americans. As statelessness loomed large on the horizon of possibilities, 
renunciants experienced the terrible vulnerability of their position. Fighting to stay in a 
nation unwilling to protect them or forgive perceived transgressions, it became clear that 
they had failed to perform the necessary qualities of conditional inclusion earlier in the 
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war. In exchange, the government indicated their willingness to uproot them from the 
nation. 
  As the end of the war approached, various bureaucratic agencies struggled to 
uphold their own goals and self-image. Their internal clashes over the renunciants 
resulted in misdirection and confusion. As renunciants appealed to various agencies and 
individuals, they received contradictory answers that prolonged the uncertainty of their 
status. T. Furuya, for example, wrote to the director of the ACLU in late July 1945 asking 
for help in withdrawing his application for renunciation.30 Despite the WRA’s ambitious 
deadline for closing the camps and its vigilant pursuit of its resettlement program since 
the beginning of 1943, only fifteen hundred incarcerees had returned to California by 
March 1945.31 By summer 1945, it became clear that the war was winding down, in light 
of the Soviet Union’s agreement to join the fight in the Pacific Theater and the Allies 
capture of Iwo Jima, and resettlement escalated in anticipation.32 Furuya, along with 
several other renunciants, began to explore the possibility of resettlement. By this time, 
renunciants received notice that the Attorney General had approved their application; 
they knew they would be leaving camp without their U.S. citizenship. Ernest Bresig, the 
Director of the ACLU, responded to Furuya confused about the legal basis for declaring 
Furuya an “alien enemy” and suggested he write to the Western Defense Command 
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(WDC) general in San Francisco to appeal his segregation orders.33 Several other 
renunciants similarly reached out to the WRA and the WDC, assuming these agencies 
could authorize their release. One individual wrote, “I am planning to relocate, so I would 
like to keep my citizenship if I can.”34 All of these renunciants hoped to be released; 
however, they found that the Department of Defense had other plans in mind. Several 
people received approval from the WRA and WDC only to be denied release by the 
Department of Justice.35 By September 1945, Ernest Besig of the ACLU began warning 
renunciants that the Department of Justice planned to detain them in internment camps 
until re/expatriation.36 This disconnect between the military, the WRA, and the 
Department of Defense hints not only at miscommunication and the unintended 
consequences of the renunciation program, but at the blatant disagreement between 
agencies. In August 1945, Edward Ennis of the Department of Defense office reported 
that the Attorney General recently wrote to the WRA requesting detention of all 
incarcerees on the renunciation list. The WRA acquiesced to this request, but only after 
approving the release of those renunciants whom the agency planned to release with all 
the other incarcerees.  
 As renunciants reckoned with the mixed messages they received from the various 
agencies detaining them, they also suffered the anxiety imposed by the period of 
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confusion. Because renunciants often corresponded by letter with three different agencies 
and consulted outside parties—such as ACLU Director Ernest Besig—they spent time 
awaiting these contradictory answers. A reply from one agency, however, rarely 
contained a final answer and led only to further confusion and correspondence. A few 
renunciants expressed the hardship of waiting in their written appeals. One individual 
wrote: “It’s awful to stay in here day after day, wondering what the future has in store for 
you, until you’re ready to fly off the handle.”37 This correspondent continued to write to 
both Besig and Ennis through September and, as her case required her parents to both 
submit affidavits to the court, it is likely her status continued to be unknown for quite 
some time after. Government agencies and renunciants alike could not foresee the 
outcome of this conflict. However, this lack of clarity forced renunciants to feel the 
impact of this uncertainty most acutely.  
 Even as this conflict played out amongst various government departments and 
bureaucrats, renunciants made plans for their life in America after the war. They planned 
to reunite with family and friends, attend school, and go back to work. One Tule Lake 
high schooler, Shigero Kawano, planned to attend university the following year. He was 
an excellent student, and Ohio State University and Washington University in St. Louis 
accepted him to their programs. His teachers and principal describe him as a good 
student, but “an emotional type of lad, highly receptive to outside influences.”38 Several 
teachers and members of his school wrote similar testimonies on his behalf. They 
emphasized his youth at the time of his application, the power of radical groups within 
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the camp, and the educational promise of his future. Regardless of these testimonies, 
Ennis wrote to Besig later that month denying Kawano permission to leave Tule Lake. It 
is unclear when they finally released Kawano from Tule Lake, but it was likely not until 
1946.  
 The threat of expatriation for renunciants created new and heightened anxieties 
around the possibility of separation from family. Since Issei never held U.S. citizenship 
to begin with, they did not join their children in renouncing their citizenship. Ironically, 
although many Nisei renounced so as to avoid resettlement and/or remain with their 
family, some renunciants found themselves trapped in Tule Lake while their parents and 
friends were released. Kisao Kamada renounced her citizenship at the wishes of her 
mother, who was concerned that camp officials could not guarantee they would not be 
separated. Her mother did not hold U.S. citizenship, and her brother was too young to 
independently renounce his own citizenship. In the mounting pressure to resettle 
incarcerees, the Relocation Office at Tule Lake told her mother and brother to relocate 
without her.39 Kamada and her family faced the possibility of indefinite separation across 
an ocean—Kamada’s brother and mother in the United States and her in Japan. The 
possibility of separation came as a direct result of the devastating bombings of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. Shoso Jimmie Kanemori renounced his citizenship, planning to join his 
mother, brothers, and sisters in Hiroshima after a prolonged separation of eight years. He 
lost his entire family and home in the bombing and wrote the Department of Justice 
afterward to withdraw his request for renunciation. His only remaining family resided in 
the United States, and he feared separation from them, as well as the place he knew as 
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home for most of his life. Kanemori’s case illuminates the varying, shifting ways in 
which people imagined home for themselves. Kanemori initially chose to reunite with his 
nuclear family but, when that future proved impossible, he sought other means of 
connection—other means of finding both a physical and immaterial home.   
 The decision to renounce and, later, to fight for their citizenship ultimately 
required renunciants to make key decisions about what home meant to them and the 
things they were willing to give up in order to attain that real or imagined home. 
Renunciants’ letters, though distinct, follow a similar format. The loyalty questionnaire 
included several questions about incarcerees’ personal life and family in order to gauge 
their assimilation into American values and culture. These questions asked incarcerees to 
report their membership in “clubs, societies, associations, etc.” as well as list their 
hobbies and the sports they played.40 Additionally, the questionnaire asked for a list of 
presumably native-born white Americans who could give character references.41 It also 
asked individuals to provide information about their relatives residing in the United 
States and, if they served in the military, to indicate whether their service was voluntary 
or compelled. While it is possible that the inclusion of these specific details in later 
appeals came about, in part, as a logical response to the values espoused by the loyalty 
questionnaire, it was more likely the result of standardized legal advice from Collins. 
Collins often sent responses to renunciants’ affidavits that included pointed 
questions for them to answer in their subsequent draft. These questions allowed 
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renunciants to reframe their experiences in ways that would more likely bring about a 
favorable legal decision. This is not to doubt the truthfulness of their testimony, but to 
acknowledge the specific way they presented their identities and past decisions. Their 
letters bear the traces of Collins’ coaching and of the tactics they used as a group to 
regain citizenship.42 Many of their letters included their birthdate and birthplace. Several 
people included this detail directly below their signed name with no introduction or 
explanation attached—as if attaching a personal title. Its implications obviously needed 
no contextualization; renunciants hoped to wield the significance afforded to birthplace in 
the allocation of citizenship for their purposes by attaching their credentials as American-
born citizens to their signatures.  
Similarly, they included evidence of participation in American culture and 
society. Several men highlighted their previous military service and honorable discharge. 
Almost every letter included a description of various family members and discussed their 
contributions to the United States. They prioritized discussing family members in the 
military, detailing the location of their service abroad, rank, and injuries or death. Lists of 
family members also included details about education, especially university attendance. 
A few renunciants who wrote especially detailed letters outlined their work experience 
prior to or during the war, emphasizing agricultural work and business—two occupations 
that often characterized American values surrounding freedom and socioeconomic 
mobility. One renunciant, David William Takatsune Araki, even went so far as to include 
his Boy Scout certificate. He discussed his accolades and the leadership positions he held 
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as a Boy Scout, listing his troop number and leader, and praised the quality of his 
experiences while part of the organization. Araki also included a portrait of himself in his 
letter to the Justice Department “for you to see with whom you are corresponding.”43 In 
doing so, he attempted to humanize himself to the bureaucrats he pleaded with. These 
details drew a picture of the varied ways in which renunciants remained rooted in the 
United States. Through their arguments, they articulated their understanding of home and 
tethered their appeal for citizenship to the things they identified as American. They 
offered up these threads as evidence that they had indeed made a home and a community 
for themselves in the United States—that they held deeply rooted ties to American 
culture and soil.  
In doing so, they simultaneously disavowed other understandings of home 
associated with Japanese culture. Many incarcerees at Tule Lake included on the loyalty 
questionnaire their membership in Japanese cultural or religious organizations, as well as 
their proficiency in and propensity for Japanese language, sports, and hobbies.44 Japanese 
cultural activities within their ethnic community held significance, in part because it 
offered a refuge from the impacts of discrimination and exclusion from society, but also 
because the creation of varied cultural institutions in America helped these communities 
create new transcultural identities. Susan Matt describes the way that immigrant 
communities “re-created a sense of home” and the familiar in order to alleviate 
homesickness while creating new identities.45 In creating these identities, they formed 
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new meanings of home and belonging as an ethnic community in the United States. By 
staking their claim to belonging by emphasizing their assimilation to American society, 
they may not have this implemented this change in practice. However, it likely influenced 
the way they conceptualized their transcultural identities and organizations. In this 
context, those identities and organizations were seen as antithetical to belonging, rather 
than a gateway to it. The threat of expatriation or deportation forced many renunciants to 
present their connection to American culture in a new way. In presenting this connection 
to government officials, they were forced to reframe and rethink the way they presented 
themselves to the United States.    
 Renunciation also forced many Nisei to choose between alternative versions of 
home. Incarceration already highlighted generational differences and often placed a strain 
on traditional family structures, emphasizing connection with peer groups instead. 
Differing views on renunciation threatened to rend family relationships indefinitely. The 
damage to these relationships persisted long after the renunciation cases had been 
resolved. Some Nisei later reported that their own parents coerced them into applying for 
renunciation. Atsushi Kagiyama and Akiko Fukuhara were both seventeen years old 
when the WRA announced they would be closing all camps within the year. Their age 
made them eligible to renounce their citizenship and, at the persistent urging of their 
parents, they submitted their applications. Both later reported feeling immense pressure 
from their peers and parents, and confusion as to the consequences of repatriation and 
renunciation. Kagiyama even reported that her parents filed her papers for repatriation 
without her knowledge. Both young women later worked independently to reclaim their 
legal status and ability to remain in the United States. Their letters to the Department of 
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Justice, the ACLU, and the WRA represent, if not a real break from their family, the 
strategic representation of such a divide. Several Nisei appealing to the ACLU and 
Department of Justice for help cited the strong influence of their parents in their decision 
to renounce, but later mentioned that their family had gone on to relocate without them. 
The representation of the radical nature of their parents plans and politics sometimes did 
not coincide with their family’s situation at the time. While disagreements over their 
strategies for survival surely created friction and harmed relationships within families, 
Nisei may have overrepresented the rupture of these relationships at times in order to 
negotiate their own position more convincingly.  
 Still, renunciation took a significant toll on Japanese American families. Fukuhara 
included a postscript to both the Department of Defense and the ACLU, asking them to 
send their replies to a different address because her parents did not know she was fighting 
for her citizenship.46 Her anguish was prevalent in her letters to both men; she linked her 
decision to a deep sense of belonging in the United States and her identity as an 
American. “It is so deeply rooted in me, that it would take more than another lifetime to 
change it.”47 Fukuhara identified her imagined home as a place and a set of values tied to 
an American identity. Although she identified the decision to go against her family’s 
wishes as “one of the most serious of [her] life,” her transition into adulthood involved 
reimagining and prioritizing the people, places, and values that she desired in her future. 
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The impact of decisions such as Fukuhara’s led to indefinite family separation—by an 
ocean and by values pertaining to their meaning of home.  
 The uncertainty of the consequences of renunciation ended in October 1945 when 
the Defense Department announced that it required all renunciants to apply for 
repatriation and that deportation would begin on November 15 of the following month. 
Ennis, the Director of the Alien Enemy Control Unit, responded to appeal letters for cases 
in which the Attorney General already finalized their approval in the negative. His 
responses heavily emphasized the petitioners’ responsibility for their “choice” and 
eschewed any further obligation of the Department of Defense. Furthermore, he leaned 
on the 1922 Supreme Court decision in Ozawa v. U.S. that deemed Japanese Americans 
“racially ineligible” for citizenship. “There is no power possessed by any government 
official to restore citizenship,” he declared. “Under the existing law, citizenship could be 
regained only through naturalization, and since, as a person of the Japanese race, you are 
not eligible for naturalization, I can see no way by which your citizenship can be 
regained.”48 Ennis maintained that renunciants chose to step out of the door; the fact that 
the door slammed behind them was none of his concern. The policy for renunciation, as 
well as the justification for the legitimacy and legality of their expulsion, specifically 
targeted Japanese Americans for their cultural, racial, and legal ineligibility for 
belonging. Faced with this barrage of justifications, renunciants spent the several months 
leading up to their supposed date of deportation in November not knowing which side of 
the Pacific would comprise their future home. Legal uprooting—or, in some cases, the 
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threat of legal uprooting—from the nation therefore impacted the ways people thought 
about the appeal or lack of appeal of future imagined homes.  
The anxiety of the previous months culminated in collective legal action, headed 
by the Tule Lake Defense Committee and lawyer Wayne M. Collins. Over a thousand 
renunciants pooled their resources and prepared materials for their case. On November 
13, 1945, two days before their planned deportations, Collins filed two mass habeus 
corpus suits that halted the planned deportations. Over five thousand renunciants 
requested mitigation hearings with the Department of Justice and became a part of a 
fourteen-year-long legal battle for restoration of citizenship. In February 1946, 4,406 
people who did not request a formal hearing were served deportation orders and boarded 
a steamer for Japan. This group included 1,523 Issei, 1,116 renunciants, and 1,767 U.S. 
citizens.49 Children and adolescents largely made up this last group, as they were not of a 
legal age to renounce citizenship for themselves but accompanied their families to Japan. 
Of the remaining renunciants who requested hearings, the Justice Department insisted on 
their continuing incarceration even as the WRA simultaneously struggled to close all 
camps. Collins eventually secured the release of 2,737 renunciants.50 These resettled 
people, however, were still stripped of their citizenship. The Justice Department shipped 
the remaining 449 renunciants and their families to the family internment camp in Crystal 
City, Texas, on March 19, 1946. The WRA closed Tule Lake’s gates for the last time, 
marking the official closure of all camps.  
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The continuing fight for the return of renunciants’ citizenship on all sides of the 
globe exemplifies one of the many ways that Japanese American incarceration escaped a 
tidy conclusion. The impacts of incarceration continued well beyond the end of the war 
and the closing of the camps for those unaffected by the renunciation program. The more 
than three thousand renunciants who remained in the United States while stripped of their 
citizenship lived through a fourteen-year battle to regain legal rights and recognition in 
the country of their birth. Lack of citizenship held pervasive, long-lasting consequences 
and signified a sinister attempt to disenfranchise this particular minority group. Law both 
reflects and perpetuates societal values, and the stripping of their citizenship during this 
intermediary period represented the continuation of their status as second-class people in 
society, depriving them of the right to vote, to run for office, to buy or purchase land in 
California, and to the basic protections afforded to citizens. Collins and leading members 
of the Tule Lake Defense Committee continued to fight legal battles on their behalf, 
following their cases through multiple appeals and updated renunciants on the status of 
their current legal battle. Collins received heavy correspondence from those incarcerated 
in various internment facilities after March 1946 and from those renunciants who were 
sent to Japan, but his correspondence with stateless individuals in the United States was 
limited. While this gap could be due to other extenuating circumstances, it could also 
demonstrate the priorities of stateless individuals allowed to stay within the continental 
U.S. Reclamation of legal belonging in the nation likely seemed less pressing or directly 
impactful once their physical removal was detached from their legal removal. Indeed, 
many renunciants who appealed to the Defense Department in the fall of 1945 pleaded 
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for their parole.51 Already maligned as disloyal and potentially dangerous, they took what 
they could get in exchange for their security.  
 Renunciants whom the Defense Department sent to Japan struggled to bridge gaps 
formed by generation, experience, and political association. These conflicts complicated 
family connections and their psychological experience of home. Both Violet Kazue, her 
husband, and her brother applied for renunciation and expatriation, and the Department of 
Justice expatriated them to Japan after the war. Kazue’s brother was a leader within the 
Hokoku Seinen Dan, and the WRA sent her husband to a detention center for the second 
part of the war. Kazue had three young children with her in Tule Lake, and she arranged 
for their expatriation along with her own. Regardless of disagreement over the degree of 
her involvement in the Hokoku Seinen Dan, it is clear that Kazue gained no advantages 
through association with her brother.52 Kazue also cited her desire to travel to Hiroshima 
to take care of their mother who was gravely injured in the bombing. Her husband, 
however, repatriated prior to her arrival in Japan and married another woman, 
abandoning her to take care of three children in war-torn Hiroshima. In 1948 and 1951, 
she sent her two oldest children back to the United States but immigration authorities 
prevented her from accompanying her children. She finally returned to the United States 
ten years after her expatriation, but struggled to reshape her relationship with her 
children. In March 1988, in a presentation on her experiences at Washington State 
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University, Kazue admitted that her decision to renounce her citizenship and take her 
children with her—essentially facilitating their deportation—was responsible for their 
estrangement.53 Children under the age of sixteen comprised 32 percent of those 
deported. Deportation of children age sixteen to nineteen comprised nearly another 10 
percent.54 Unlike the Nisei born before 1924, these children never held dual citizenship 
with Japan. Because they did not enter Japan as citizens, their migration from the United 
States to Japan can more accurately be described as deportation. Their lives would 
crisscross oceans, their legal status would vacillate between nations, and their wartime 
dislocation promised to leave a mark on their unstable experiences of home and 
belonging.  
 The Defense Department’s insistence that most Nisei held dual citizenship 
resulted in deportation rather than expatriation. Up until 1924, Japanese law granted 
citizenship to the children of Japanese nationals regardless of birthplace—a policy called 
jus sanguinis. Many Nisei held dual citizenship for this reason, although anyone born 
after 1924 did not. In the 1930s, many Nisei renounced their Japanese citizenship in 
response to rising geopolitical tension.55 Still, some reported ignorance of their 
citizenship status. The Department of Defense denied responsibility for obtaining or 
considering this information, arguing that “it is reasonable to presume that a person born 
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in the United States of Japanese parents who during a war between the United States and 
Japan voluntarily renounces his United States citizenship and declares his allegiance to 
Japan is, in fact, a national of Japan.”56 They proposed treating renunciation and Japanese 
citizenship synonymously. As a result, several renunciants arrived in occupied Japan 
entirely without citizenship. Thus they gained the nickname of “strandees”—stateless 
individuals sent to Japan without a clear claim to belonging in either nation.  
 Their ongoing effort to regain citizenship in the United States clashed with 
practical concerns in post-war Japan. Collins often contacted renunciants with reports he 
received from the Attorney General’s office informing him of further roadblocks. The 
U.S. Supreme Court upheld a ruling in a lower court that voting in a foreign election 
made a person ineligible for citizenship in the United States.57 Additionally, registering as 
a citizen of Japan made that person ineligible, as well. Several renunciants in Japan 
registered as Japanese citizens and voted in Japanese elections in the fourteen years they 
awaited formal return of their U.S. citizenship. Legal visibility in occupied Japan was 
required for access to basic needs, such as ration cards for food. Statelessness impacted 
their children, too. One woman reported her inability to register her newborn daughter in 
Japan without adding her own name to the family koseki, where births were recorded.58 
Another man qualified his registration for Japanese citizenship to Collins by explaining 
that he needed to be a citizen in order to obtain an education for his two children.59 Most 
                                               
56 Edward Ennis to Ernest Besig, August 22, 1945, folder 6, box 21, Collins Papers, BANC.  
57 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).  
58 Japanese law required this family registry in order to report births; Naoye Furukawa to Wayne M. 
Collins, September 12, 1955, folder 11, box 8, Collins Papers, BANC.  
59 Toshikazu Kishi, personal questionnaire, July 27, 1957, 1943-1962 Strandees Individual Case Files, 
folder 2, box 16, Collins Papers, BANC.  
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strandees argued that the U.S. General Douglas MacArthur compelled them to participate 
in the election of 1957.60 They faced significant barriers due to their status as “strandees” 
that impacted their quality of life and ability to adjust to post-war conditions and 
occupying powers’ demands. They spent years neither wholly divorced from their past in 
the United States nor fully attached to their future in Japan. Many strandees engaged with 
the process of regaining U.S. citizenship and held out hope that their return would one 
day become possible. Still, they could not—and did not—put their lives on hold. They 
put down roots; they reconnected with family members, sent their children to school, 
registered as Japanese citizens, and voted.  
Individual case files demonstrate a consistent pattern of backtracking and years of 
back and forth. Progress came in waves, usually in the form of preliminary administrative 
clearance and then an invitation for them to register for citizenship and passport at the 
U.S. consul. In March 1958, Collins wrote Masayuki Akiyoshi in Japan to tell him that 
his application for citizenship had been denied. He doggedly coached Akiyoshi in 
rewriting and submitting yet another affidavit over the next few months, sending line 
edits and specific advice for how to answer certain questions. One year later, in April 
1959, Collins informed Akiyoshi that his citizenship had been restored.61 Some iteration 
of this pattern occurred in almost every case file. Practical concerns such as reclamation 
of lost property in the United States or survival in post-war Japan guided their decisions. 
Sometimes they made their decisions based on access to immediate benefits or rights that 
                                               
60 Strandees Individual Case Files, 1943-1962, Collins Papers, BANC.  
61 Masayuki Akiyoshi and Wayne M. Collins, 1947-1959, Individual Case Files, folder 1, box 7, Collins 
Papers, BANC.  
  129 
came from whichever country was ready to give it to them first.62 Mae Ngai describes the 
internal pragmatism that influenced participation in the renunciation program in the first 
place: “But if renunciants acted out of self interest they were no different from most 
ordinary people, who are concerned more with their individual and family’s well-being 
than with the interests of the nation-state.”63 This continued to be true for renunciants in 
Japan during the decade following the war.  
By 1959, Collins had won the majority of the cases filed and had restored 
citizenship to all but a few renunciants, including those who had resided in Japan for over 
a decade. In May 1959, he sent out a form letter to renunciants reading:  
The Justice Department has reached the conclusion that you personally renounced 
citizenship because of fear, coercion, and duress. Therefore, it is willing to 
withdraw the offer of proof it made against you in the mass class equity suits 
whereupon a judgment can be entered in your favor in the U.S. District Court 
cancelling your renunciation on the ground of duress and declaring you to be a 
citizen of the United States.64 
 
The letter officially marked the end of a major set of appeals in their court case and 
opened the door for most renunciants to reclaim citizenship. This was certainly not the 
last form letter of its kind that Collins sent, nor did this mark the end of his work on the 
cases of approximately five thousand renunciants in both Japan and the U.S. Collins 
officially resolved the last of these cases and hung up his hat in 1968—more than two full 
decades after the end of the war and the closing of incarceration camps. It is unclear how 
many deported renunciants returned to the United States, but the extended period of time 
                                               
62 Naoye Furukawa discusses this predicament in her letters to Collins, describing how she was 
simultaneously seeking citizenship in Japan. Individual Case Files, folder 11, box 8, Collins Papers, 
BANC.  
63 Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 200.  
64 Wayne M Collins to Mr. Akira Dick Hashimoto, May 29, 1959, Individual Case Files, folder 16, box 8, 
Collins Papers, BANC.  
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in which many people waited for their verdict would suggest that their return would not 
have been a simple decision. Japan’s economy recovered rapidly during the Cold War, 
improving industry and living standards. Renunciants likely experienced the benefits of 
this economic boom alongside a community they had become a part of over the course of 
the decade they lived there. Although close family members often still lived in the United 
States, they may have felt at home in Japan and averse to uprooting the new life they had 
built to go through with a long-awaited return.  
 The story of renunciants in Japan in the many years following the war is an 
incomplete one. Although some people sent Collins notices of their change in address, 
others disappear entirely from his record. He diligently sent them reminders of 
unanswered letters sometimes for as long as a few years since he last heard from them, 
and reached out to relatives of theirs to try to find their new residence. Collins worked 
and prepared multiple affidavits with Toshikazu Kishi through 1957 and 1958. However, 
he stopped receiving replies from Kishi sometime in 1959. He diligently attempted to 
reconnect with Kishi in order to inform him that he could, in fact, now reclaim his U.S. 
citizenship. In November 1960, as one of his many attempts to contact the renunciant, 
Collins reached out to Kishi’s cousin in California to inquire whether he knew Kishi’s 
current whereabouts. The cousin simply replied, “still in Japan.”65  
 Legal belonging—or lack thereof—put Japanese American renunciants in a 
vulnerable position in the United States and in Japan. Following incarceration, Japanese 
Americans understood the potential consequences of social vulnerability acutely. 
                                               
65 Data sheet for Toshikazu Ben Kishi, November 22, 1960, 1943-1962 Strandees Individual Case Files, 
folder 2, box 16, Collins Papers, BANC.  
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Citizenship status certainly did not guarantee stability, but it did allow access to a sense 
of belonging to a national and protected community. Some chose to give up this status in 
order to pursue other means of belonging and regretted this decision. Yet, they suffered 
its consequences and bore the weight of responsibility for a decision they made in a very 
particular political and social context.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 On March 8, 1967 Hayao Chuman picked up his pen and addressed a letter to 
Wayne Collins. He likely had not anticipated further communication with the lawyer. 
Three years prior, Collins had informed him that the Department of Defense had once 
again denied his request to cancel his renunciation of citizenship. The government still 
held that Chuman had renounced his citizenship freely and that, at the time of his 
decision, he had truly intended to leave the United States—an impression that may well 
have been true. As Chuman expressed in this letter, he had believed his case was 
officially over and was surprised to hear Collins that was still working on it. Although the 
Department of Defense had refused to acknowledge its own missteps, they had agreed 
that Chuman could apply for naturalization and regain his United States citizenship 
through that avenue. Chuman’s purpose in writing the letter was to tell Collins to drop his 
case and express his disinterest in applying for naturalization. “I am now fifty-three years 
old and I’m not sure if I will live another twenty years. Besides, I do not have any 
ambition to become a politician, an important leader, or a millionaire. I believe when I go 
to [be] beside God, I do not need any country’s passport. [The] only thing I need is how I 
lived in this world.”1 He filled out and revised affidavits and paid Collins for legal 
services for over a decade to regain his birthright citizenship only to later deny the 
opportunity to become a naturalized citizen.  
There are a few different ways we can interpret this choice. First, Chuman may 
have attached very different meanings to birthright citizenship and naturalized 
                                               
1 Hayao Chuman to Wayne M. Collins, March 8, 1967, folder 10, box 7, Collins Papers, BANC.  
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citizenship. One involved the reclamation of the rights and status he felt had been taken 
from him, and the other involved asking the government that incarcerated him for 
permission to access the rights and obligations attached to legal belonging in the United 
States. Especially after his wife regained citizenship status in 1958, perhaps he felt that 
any practical imperatives driving his initial pursuit of citizenship had lost significance. 
Most importantly, however, his letter demonstrates the way Chuman came to redefine 
home and belonging in the United States. Inability to access citizenship no longer 
interfered with what he had come to see as most important in his life. He explained that 
he saw his priority as raising his eight children to be “decent and well-educated,” 
expressing pride in the fact that three of them were already attending university.2 For 
him, belonging became divorced from citizenship and the status and potential 
opportunities it could have granted him. His decision to remain stateless was neither an 
act of resistance nor passivity. Agency, for him, meant adaptation. For the longest time he 
could not change his citizenship status, so he reduced its power over his ability to regain 
an imagined home and sense of belonging. His story, then, demonstrates the often 
fractured and precarious nature of citizenship for some groups.  
The legal, social, and physical uprooting of incarcerees was broadly shaped by 
their identities as Japanese Americans, but the contours of these patterns were shaped by 
transnational and transcultural identities, as well. Those who accessed conditional 
inclusion during incarceration by affirming loyalty as proof of belonging still experienced 
uprooting, but not to the extent of those who chose other methods of securing their future. 
The Tule Lake segregation center, therefore, offers insight into the ways that Japanese 
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Americans exercised agency to express their relationship to the United States. Those who 
emphasized loyalty tied this concept to citizenship. This self-representation helped them 
achieve their objectives, but fostered restrictive ideas of Japanese American “character” 
and conditions for belonging. The restrictive nature of this strategy reveals itself at the 
Tule Lake segregation camp, specifically, because those individuals chose a different 
method of pursuing belonging.  
Incarceration prompted a series of forced migrations that echoed previous patterns 
of movement. Restrictive immigration and land ownership legislation often compelled 
frequent movement prior to the war, “disloyalty” inspired additional movement during 
incarceration, and the lack of housing and employment on the West Coast following 
incarceration meant that many Japanese Americans worked for many years to regain a 
stable home. Legal uprooting—or changing relationships to the rights and obligations of 
United States citizenship—represented another way that Japanese Americans experienced 
uprootedness during the period of incarceration. The decision to renounce citizenship 
ultimately emerged out of the desire to reclaim belonging, but its consequences fell far 
outside the narrow definition of Japanese American citizenship.  
Looking at incarceration and citizenship as contributors to a long pattern of 
uprootedness allows an examination of the way that repeated denial of Japanese 
American access to home and belonging was part of the experience of—and barriers to—
conditional inclusion in the United States. Citizenship and belonging are overlapping, but 
not equivalent, categories. These concepts factor differently into individuals’ conception 
of home and identity. Certain groups’ experience of home are more precarious, as 
demonstrated by Japanese American experiences during incarceration. Patterns of 
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uprootedness ultimately allow us to see the stakes and longevity of incarceration—and 
the ways Japanese Americans reframed home and belonging in order to find themselves 
rooted again.  
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